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96 Fla. 30

117 So 377

Smith v. State

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided June 20, 1928

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1928-06-20

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"The judgment should be reversed because of the variance between the allegation and proof as to ownership. Under the statutes denouncing burglarious entering the allegation of ownership of the building alleged to have been entered is material and must be proved as laid."”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 347 So. 2d 659 - Salerno v. State

Relies on Smith v. State · Burnes v. State · Potter v. State of Florida

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1928-06-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently April 2012 · most notably 370 So. 2d 795 - In Interest of ME (1979), 120 So. 2d 195 - Holzapfel v. State (1960)

40 state decisions

2001928193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Ellis, C. J.

¶1 Information was filed in the Criminal Court of Record for Dade County'Charging the plaintiff in error with the offense of breaking and entering a dwelling place in Miami, the property of Frank Heide, “with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: Grand Larceny, with intent to take, steal and carry away money, goods and chattels of the value of more than Fifty ($50.00) Dollars”. The *31 accused pleaded not guilty. The verdict was as follows: “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged, so say we all”, and was signed by the foreman.

¶2 A motion for a new trial was denied and the accused seeks a reversal of the judgment on writ of error.

¶3 The only point discussed in the brief is that* there is a fatal variance between the allegation of ownership as to the premises entered and the proof on that point.

¶4 The allegation in the information as to the ownership of the dwelling entered places it in one Frank Heide, the proof shows it to have been the property of IT. Rich Mooney.

¶5 Heide was an employe of Mooney. His duties were to take care of the grounds and open the house occasionally for ventilation. He had a key to the house but did not live in it or on the premises. »

¶6 The Assistant Attorney General, who appears for the State, submits the case without argument because he is unable to satisfy himself that the record does not present a case of reversible error.

¶7 The judgment should be reversed because of the variance between the allegation and proof as to ownership. Under the statutes denouncing burglarious entering the allegation of ownership of the building alleged to have been entered is material and must be proved as laid. See Pells v. State, 20 Fla. 774; Burns v. State, 89 Fla. 494, 104 So. R. 783; Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315, 85 So. R. 911; Vincent v. State, 66 Fla. 197, 63 So. R. 423; Davis v. State, 51 Fla. 37, 40 So. R. 179, Potter v. State, 91 Fla. 938, 109 So. R. 91.

¶8 Reversed.

Whitfield, Terrell, Strum and Buford, J. J., concur. Brown, J., absent on account of illness.
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