¶1(dissenting).
¶2I dissent from the ultimate conclusion of the majority opinion. Plaintiffs-appellants herein are members of the Second Regular Session of the Forty-first Idaho Legislature. These legislators challenge the constitutionality of the legislation in question on the basis of procedural irregularities involved in its passage by the legislature and approval by the Governor.
¶3The majority opinion holds that the legislation in question is not unconstitutional as having been passed in violation of that portion of the Constitution requiring revenue bills to originate in the House of Representatives. With this conclusion I agree. I believe the key word of the constitutional provision is “originate.” There is no question but that the legislation in question is a revenue measure. There is likewise no question that it originated in the House. The only question is whether or not the Senate must sit by and either reject or approve in its entirety a measure proposed and passed by the House. Appellant cites only the case of Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1922). It is clear that Dumasprovides no authority for appellants’ assertion. There the court said:
“The validity of this act is also denied on the ground that it is a bill for the raising of revenue, and it having originated in the Senate, contravenes Art. 3, sec. 14 of the constitution, …
¶4It was clear in Dumasthat “Senate Bill No. 298” had originated in the Senate and was also clear that a portion of the legislation “that there is hereby assessed upon all taxable property within the State of Idaho for the years 1921-1922, a tax of l/g mill on the dollar …” was “a measure for raising revenue … [and] is as truly a tax levied for governmental purposes … and therefore falls within the inhibition of Article 3, Section 14 of the Constitution.”
¶5Appellants state herein “it is not the contention of plaintiffs herein that the Senate does not have the power to reject in total revenue raising measures that originate in the House nor is it the contention of the plaintiffs herein that the Senate cannot amend portions of revenue raising bills, so long as the Senate does not effect a change in the actual substance of revenue raising portion of the bill.” For this assertion appellants cite no authority and none has been drawn to my attention. I agree with the majority that such interpretation placed on Art. 3, Sec. 14 of the Constitution would be strained and a derogation of legislative powers conferred on the Senate.
¶6I must however disagree with and dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion. It is clear from the facts as submitted by both parties to this action that the legislation originated in the House, was passed and transmitted to the Senate. In the Senate such bill was considered and an amendment thereto was proposed and adopted, and the bill as amended was passed by the Senate. Thereafter it was transmitted to the House in a form containing the Senate amendment. The House considered the bill as amended by the Senate *182and passed said amended bill. Such bill was not transmitted to the Governor.
¶7Whatever one may denominate the document which was considered and signed by the Governor, it was not that legislation passed by the legislative branch of government. To add to the complexity of the matter, the facts indicate that the document submitted to the Governor contained a title which was further misleading in that it indicated that matters were contained in the body of the document which in actuality did not exist in the body. The fault, although perhaps immaterial, must be ascribed to those legislative officials over whose signature the document was submitted to the Governor containing a misrepresentation, albeit it was innocent and inadvertent.
¶8I disagree with the majority analysis of the preceding Idaho cases on this question. I see no way to escape the conclusion of Katerndahl v. Daugherty, 30 Idaho 356, 164 P. 1017 (1917). In Katerndahl the precise situation as presented herein was considered by the court and disposed of in a brief one page opinion. Therein it was stated:
“It was further agreed that the bill now on file in the office of Secretary of State, bearing the signatures of the presiding officers of the two Houses and the Governor, does not contain the amendment which was made by the Senate and agreed to by the House.”
¶9The court therein disposed of the matter succinctly by stating:
“ * … By the agreed statement of facts the bill as amended was never presented to the Governor, and therefore cannot be a law of the state. This proposition is sufficient to dispose of this case.” 30 Idaho at 358-359, 164 P. at 1018.
¶10I believe the majority’s consideration of Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948) is completely irrelevant and that Keenanis beyond the purview of the instant situation. Therein the necessity of presentation of a legislative bill to the Governor was not under consideration. Keenandealt only with a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment. That proposed constitutional amendment had been presented to the people and by them ratified. The court in Keenan v. Price, states:
“Another factor which must be noted and which must govern in the determination of this issue is ‘that every reasonable presumption, both of law and fact, is to be indulged in favor of the validity of an amendment to the Constitution when it is attacked after its ratification by the people.’ ” 68 Idaho at 434, 195 P.2d at 667. (Emphasis supplied)
¶11I believe that the reliance on State v. Hanson, 81 Idaho 403, 342 P.2d 706, in the majority opinion is misplaced. In Hanson, although the factual pattern was somewhat similar to the case at bar, there were nevertheless very important differences. Those differences were the reason for that court’s decision. In Hansona bill originated in the House, was amended there, and passed as amended. In the Senate, the bill was further amended and passed as containing the House amendment and the Senate amendment. It was returned to the House. The House concurred in the Senate amendment and passed the bill as amended in the House and as amended in the Senate. A document purporting to represent that bill, as amended by the Senate and as amended by the House, was transmitted to the Governor. The Governor, upon presentation to him, approved the document and returned the same to the House, stating that he had signed the bill on the basis as the bill had actually passed the legislature rather than on the basis as presented to him. The court in Hansontook judicial notice of the Governor’s communication and stated:
“From this communication it appears that the governor knew the bill as passed by the legislature provided for a rate of 3%, not a rate of 3.5%. It is therefore obvious that his approval was of the 3% rate and not the 3.5% rate.
if? % % if1 #
“It is these records of the governor’s official action which distinguishes this case *183from Katerndahl v. Daugherty, supra. In that case there was nothing to show that the governor did not approve the bill as enrolled. In this case the record conclusively shows that all three of the divisions of legislative power — the house, the senate, and the governor — approved the house amendment and made it a part of the act.” 81 Idaho at 415, 342 P.2d at 713.
¶12It is therefore my conclusion that the facts in the case at bar fall squarely in Katerndahland demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the legislation in question. I further conclude that there are no facts in the instant case to bring it within the purview of State v. Hanson, supra, and hence distinguishable from Katerndahl.
¶13I would reverse the trial court’s judgment that House Bill 789 is constitutional and remand the case, with directions, that summary judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs-appellants. Such action would render moot the further question presented by plaintiffs-appellants regarding the validity of the title to the act as contrasted with the material contained in the body of the bill.