¶1(dissenting).
¶2This action comes to this Court in the form of an appeal from a judgment of dismissal based on the respondent’s motion for summary judgment that alleged that the plaintiff-appellant Kenneth W. Johnson’s action was barred by the statute of limitations.
¶3Summary judgment can be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
“Summary judgment is proper if the evidence before the court on the motion would warrant a directed verdict if the case were to go to trial. When the moving party presents materials which would entitle him to a directed verdict if presented at trial, the responding party may not hold back his evidence; he must present sufficient materials to establish a triable issue. Those materials must set forth the facts with particularity; for if general averments were sufficient the summary judgment procedure would lose its utility. The requirement of specificity is underscored in cases where the moving defendant has established, prima facie, a defense grounded on the statute of limitations.”6
¶4Johnson bore the burden of proof of establishing that his action was not barred by I.C. § 5 — 219.
¶5The majority concludes that the discovery exception to the statute of limitations announced in Renner v. Edwards
¶6In the Renner case, the discovery rule in malpractice actions was extended to circumstances involving misdiagnosis resulting in erroneous surgery. The patient in that case engaged the services of a doctor who negligently diagnosed her condition and thereafter performed an unnecessary colostomy. After the surgery the patient suffered continuous pain and inability to control her bodily functions. The patient sought relief from several doctors and it was not until some three years after the surgery was it discovered that the surgery was unnecessary. It was held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the unnecessary surgery was discovered, or should have been discovered.
¶7In order for Johnson to overcome the motion for summary judgment he must produce sufficient “specific” evidence showing that the discovery rule is applicable to his action. For the discovery rule to apply the following elements must be shown:
¶8(1) Negligence or malpractice by the doctor;
¶9(2) Ignorance of the malpractice by the patient.
¶10Johnson’s purpose in going to Dr. Brunt was to have him examine two lumps that had formed on his back. Although it is not clear, it appears from the record that the two lumps were not located at the place where the drains were left in Johnson’s back. The lumps were removed by Dr. Brunt and the drains were not in the lumps.
¶11The majority states that “Johnson allegedly told Dr. Brunt that the drains installed by Dr. Stoddard had disappeared” *236which would appear to add to the evidence that it was malpractice not to find the drains. Dr. Brunt stated in his answer to Johnson’s interrogatories that,
“I had no discussion with him as to Pen-rose drainage tubes. The name Penrose was never mentioned. At a time when I was removing sutures from the patient at the conclusion of my treatment, he mentioned that he had some prior trouble with drains, but did not elaborate on it.”8
¶12Furthermore, in Johnson’s deposition he stated,
Q I believe you did advise Doctor Brunt, at least you have so stated earlier, that you did advise Doctor Brunt of the occurrence where the drains had been either lost or fallen or something the year before ?
“A Yes.
“Q And you discussed this with Doctor Brunt?
“A Not to any extent as far as I remember. I just told him that there was two missing, lost or something.”9
¶13It appears that Dr. Brunt was not sufficiently informed of the missing drains in a meaningful manner to charge him with notice thereof and negligence in failing to find and remove them.
¶14There was no evidence in the form of testimony presented by Johnson that the conduct of Dr. Brunt constituted malpractice in treating Johnson for the two lumps and not finding the drains.
“The general rule is that a practitioner of one of the healing arts, while remaining within the scope of his field of practice, is entitled to have the standard of treatment he gave a patient tested by the rules and principles of the school of medicine to which he belongs, and not by those of some other school.”10
¶15The standard of care for physicians has been fixed by this Court as,
“[Tjhe exercise of the care and skill ordinarily exercised by competent physicians and surgeons in the same or like locality, in the light of present day learning and scientific knowledge of, and professional advancement in the subject.”11
¶16Without a supporting record there is no basis for concluding Dr. Brunt acted negligently in his treatment of Johnson. To overcome the motion for summary judgment, Johnson was required to come forward with evidence as to why he was unable to discover Dr. Brunt’s alleged negligence within two years.
¶17There was insufficient record established by Johnson to overcome Dr. Brunt’s motion for summary judgment. The district court’s dismissal of the action should be affirmed.
¶18. I.C. § 5-219 (amended 1971).
¶19. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Schaefer v. Elswood Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654, 516 P.2d 1168 (1973); Turner v. Mendenhall, 95 Idaho 426, 510 P.2d 490 (1973); Bryan and Company v. Kieckbusch, 94 Idaho 116, 482 P.2d 91 (1971).
¶20. Schaefer v. Elswood Trailer Sales, supra, note 1.
¶21. Amended 1971.
¶22. 94 Idaho 595, 495 P.2d 1 (1972).
¶23. Johnson v. Gorton, supra, note 5, at 598, 495 P.2d at 4.
¶24. 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970).
¶25. Clerk’s transcript, pp. 38-39.
¶26. Johnson’s deposition, clerk’s transcript, pi 49.
¶27. Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164, 169, 409 P.2d 110, 113 (1965).
¶28. Flock v. Palumbo, 63 Idaho 220, 230, 118 P.2d 707, 711 (1941); see also W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 164-165 (4th ed. 1971).