96 Md. App. 722 - Fields v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] standard that examines the intent of the prosecutor, though certainly not entirely free from practical difficulties, is a manageable standard to apply. It merely calls for the court to make a finding of fact. Inferring the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances is a familiar process in our criminal justice system.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 163 Md. App. 322 - Giddins v. State · Robinson v. Com.

2. “Many of the prosecutorial errors that trigger mistrials and reversals consist of grossly negligent and even deliberate conduct. The law has never looked upon the declaration of a mistrial and the appellate reversal as mild slaps upon the wrist, but has treated them as rigorous means for redressing even grossly negligent and deliberate misconduct. . . . [0]ur constitutional law has always permitted a retrial following such mistrial or reversal. . . . When the prosecution suffers a mistrial or an appellate reversal, it is considered to have suffered a stem rebuke in terms of lost days, lost dollars, lost resources of many varieties and the lost opportunity to make the conviction stick. It is only in the Machiavellian situation where the prosecutor deliberately courts a mistrial that the normal sanctions are self-evidently inadequate. A scheming prosecutor cannot be rewarded by being handed the very thing toward which he connived. For all other error, it is certainly not a condonation of misconduct simply to determine that, among the arsenal of sanctions, the sanction for such misconduct is a sanction other than the double jeopardy bar.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Robinson v. Commonwealth · Robinson v. Com.

3. “There are three key players involved in every [criminal] trial: the judge, the prosecutor, and the defendant (directly or through his agent, the defense attorney). In terms of the Machiavellian employment of the mistrial device deliberately to sabotage a trial perceived to be going badly for the prosecution, the historic culprits were the judge and the prosecuting attorney. When, therefore, a mistrial is declared, over the objection of the defense, either at the request of the prosecution or sua sponte by the judge, the rule provides that no mistrial will be permitted unless there was a “manifest necessity” for the mistrial.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 163 Md. App. 322 - Giddins v. State · 116 Md. App. 69 - Malpas v. State