¶1concurring,
¶2I agree that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, but only because NRS 48.125
¶3The State’s contention that the scope of the phrase “[ejvidence of a plea of guilty ... or an offer to plead guilty” should be limited to only actual pleas of guilty or offers to plead and not to the statements made while entering those pleas is completely unreasonable, illogical and without merit.
¶4Likewise, the State’s attempt to have this court extend Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), to control this case is merit-less and warrants no consideration or discussion.
“1. Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or of an offer to plead guilty to the crime charged or any other crime is not admissible in a criminal proceeding involving the person who made the plea or offer.
2. Evidence of a plea of nolo contendere or of an offer to plead nolo con-tendere to the crime charged or any other crime is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving the person who made the plea or offer.”
¶6dissenting:
¶7Although I agree with the majority and concurring opinions that an accused’s statements made pursuant to a plea agreement in the course of entering a guilty plea are not admissible to impeach his testimony at trial, I would not reverse the conviction for that error. Indeed, in my view, the issue should not be addressed by this court. It is Mann’s assertion that the erroneous ruling of the trial judge caused him not to testify at trial, and that had he testified the verdict may have been different. I am not willing to accept that bald assertion as true and accord it the validity which my brethren apparently are willing to give it. He was an ex-felon. Perhaps that is why he did not testify. *68Or, it may be that he had nothing of value to state in explanation of his presence inside the shoe store. I would prefer to decide the evidence issue in a case where the defendant elects to testify, is impeached by statements made in the course of entering a guilty plea later set aside, and a conviction returned. In such a case I would vote to reverse for the reasons mentioned in today’s opinion. Here, however, the impeaching statements were not before the jury, and the accused, for some reason not truly within our knowledge, decided to utilize his privilege not to testify. In this context, I am not willing to set aside the conviction.