¶1I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority. At the outset, I cannot agree that the trial court’s failure to enter the guilty verdict or formally set aside the verdict is equivalent to the granting of a motion for acquittal. As a matter of fact, no final determination has been made in this case by the trial court; therefore, there is nothing from which the State can appeal. For this reason, I would dismiss this appeal.
¶2On the merits, if it can be assumed that an appeal lies, I would affirm the district court. The failure of the State, within the facts and posture of this case, to allege the proper name of the buyer of the controlled substance adversely affected the substantial rights of respondent to his prejudice.
¶3Preparing a defense to a charge that he had sold heroin, “to a person over the age of 21 years, to-wit: G. Jolley”, when he knew he had not done so is much less complex than preparing a defense to a charge that he had sold heroin to a Robert Scheri, who may or may not be over the age of 21 years and to whom respondent may or may not have sold heroin.
¶4Furthermore, because of the diverse and complex penalties that may be assessed by a trial court pursuant to NRS 453.321 as well as certain prohibition to probation therein (NRS 453.321(3)), it is very important that a defendant be fully and correctly apprised of the exact person to whom he is accused of selling a controlled substance, as well as the correct age of the buyer. Anything less is fatally prejudicial.