¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent, because I disagree with the majority’s holding that the informant’s tip was unreliable. The tip had “some indicia of reliability,” giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant committed a crime. State v. Faulkner, 89 Or *120App 120, 123, 747 P2d 1011 (1987); State v. Black, 80 Or App 12, 19, 721 P2d 842 (1986). The informant voluntarily initiated personal contact with Trooper Howard and told him that he had personally observed defendant’s erratic driving. Those facts tend to establish the basis of the informant’s knowledge.
¶3I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this case is indistinguishable from the anonymous informant in Black. Even though Howard failed to get the informant’s name, the informant was identifiable, not a faceless tipster. Unlike the informant in Black, who gave a tip over the telephone and refused to reveal her identity, the informant here did not refuse to give his name. He made himself and his vehicle available to Howard for identification. On the basis of that contact, the officer could have inferred that he would have given his name, had he been asked. The informant’s personal contact with the police exposed him to greater civil or criminal liability than would the act of a person giving information over the phone. See State v. Faulkner, supra, 89 Or App at 123; State v. Black, supra, 80 Or App at 19. The “tipster” only remained unidentified because the officer did not request identification. The reliability of the motorist who stopped to report defendant’s erratic driving should not be diminished because of something the officer did not do.
¶4I would hold that, under the totality of the circumstances, Howard could reasonably suspect that defendant was committing the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicants and that, therefore, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress.