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← 96 U.S. 108 - Arthur v. Morrison

Arthur v. Morrison’s Empirical Analysis

96 U.S. 108 · 1877

Citation profile

65
cited by 65 later decisions
17
cited 17 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
December 1961
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 65 later decisions (17 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1961 · most notably American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington (1891), Roberts v. Northern Pacific Railroad (1895)

8 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

2601877188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Nelson Elliott v. Samuel Swartwout · Two Hundred Chests of Tea · Movius v. Arthur · Homer v. The Collector

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The question of law thus presented is whether veils which are not commonly called ‘ silk veils,’ but are veils manufactured of silk, and are commercially known as ‘ crepe veils,’ and not otherwise, are liable to a duty ,of 60 per cent. The argument of the government is that the statute in question is a comprehensive one, intended to include all articles made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, specifically enumerating in its first branch a variety of subjects on which should be imposed a duty of 60 per cent., and further providing that on all manufactures from that material not otherwise provided for a duty of 50 per cent, should be levied and collected.' Silk veils, it is said, are specifically enumerated as being liable to < duty of 60 per cent., and the articles in question, being veils of which tin. material is silk, are within the enumerating clause of the statute. If this were all, the argument would be a strong one. But the fact that the veils in question are1 universally known and recognized among merchants and importers as ‘ crepe veils,’ and not otherwise, and are never called or known as ‘ silk veils,-’ is to be taken into account. Although crepe is shown to be a material of silk to which a certain resinous substance has been applied, neither the merchant nor the ordinary buyer understands them to be identical. Neither the merchant who should order a ease of crepes and receive one of silk goods, or who should order silk and recei”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.