Peugh v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis
96 U.S. 332 · 1877
Citation profile
37 federal appellate · 11 district · 140 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 256 later decisions (18 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2017 · most notably Helvering v. Lazarus (1939), 24 Cal. 2d 1 - Beeler v. American Trust Co. (1944)
37 federal appellate · 11 district · 140 state decisions — followed in 34 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Badger v. Badger · Russell v. Southard · Hughes v. Edwards · Villa v. Rodriguez
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 256 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““It is an established doctrine that a court of equity will treat a deed, absolute in form, as a mortgage, when it is executed as security for a loan of money. That court looks beyond the terms of the instrument to the real transaction; and when that is shown to be one of security, and not of sale, it will give effect to the actual contract of the parties. As the equity, upon which the court acts in such cases, arises from the real character of the transaction, any evidence, written or oral, tending to show this is admissible. The rule which excludes parol testimony to contradict or vary a written instrument, has reference to the language used by the parties. That cannot be qualified, or varied from its natural import, but must speak for itself. The rule does not forbid an inquiry into the object of the parties in executing and receiving the instrument.””
21 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““But strong expressions, used with reference to the particular facts under consideration, however often repeated by subsequent writers, cannot safely be taken as fixing an abstract rule. We think that, inasmuch as the mortgagee in possession may'exercise an undue influence over the mortgagor, especially if the latter be in needy circumstances, the purchase by the former of the equity of redemption is to be carefully scrutinized when fraud is charged; and Unit only constructive fraud, or an unconscicntious advantage which ought not to be retained, need be shown, to avoid such a purchase. But we are unwilling to lay down a rule which would be likely to prevent any prudent mortgagee in possession, however fair his intentions may be, from purchasing the property, by making the validity of the purchase depend on his ability afterwards to show that he paid for the property all that any one would be willing to give. We do not deem it for the benefit of mortgagors that such a rule should exist.””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. De Martin v. Phelan“should be charged with a reasonable sum for the use and occupation of the premises from the time he took possession in 1865, and allowed for the taxes paid and other necessary expenses incurred by him.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Peugh v. Davis
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.