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← 96 U.S. 467 - Casey v. Cavaroc

Casey v. Cavaroc’s Empirical Analysis

96 U.S. 467 · 1877

Citation profile

239
cited by 239 later decisions
15
cited 15 times by the Supreme Court
27
states following
August 2006
most recently cited

74 federal appellate · 30 district · 71 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 239 later decisions (15 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2006 · most notably Waterman v. Mackenzie (1891), Hadacheck v. Sebastian (1915)

74 federal appellate · 30 district · 71 state decisions — followed in 27 states

46018771880189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on The President Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States v. Dandridge · Sawyer v. Turpin · Yeatman v. Savings Institution · Clark Assignee v. Iselin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 239 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Tbe requirement of possession is an inexorable rule of law, adopted to prevent fraud and deception; for, if tbe debtor remains in possession, tbe law presumes that those who deal with him do so on the faith of his being the unqualified owner of the goods.””
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““In suc-li ease they [the securities] are held by the creditor by way oí mortgage as well as pledge, and a mortgage is valid notwithstanding the mortgagor has the possession. The difference ordinarily recognized between a mortgage and a pledge is that the title is transferred by the former, and possession" by the latter. Indeed, possession may be considered as of the very essence of a pledge (Potliier, Nantissement, 8); and, if possession be once given up. the pledge, as such, is extinguished. The possession need not be actual. It may be constructive, as where the key of a warehouse containing the goods pledged is delivered, or a hill of lading is assigned. In such case the act. done will be considered as a token, standing for actual delivery of the goods. It puts the property under the power and control of the creditor. In some cases such constructive delivery cannot be effected without doing what amounts to a transfer of the property also. The assignment of a bill of lading is of that kind. Such an assignment is necessary, where a pledge is proposed, in order to give the constructive possession required, to constitute a pledge; and yet it formally transfers the title also. In such a. case there, is a union of two distinct forms of security; that of mortgage and that of pledge; mortgage by virtue of the title, and pledge by virtue of the possession. “Tills advantage exists when notes and bills are transferred to a creditor by way of collateral security. Ills possession of th”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “securing equal justice to all its creditors ... under a law which sternly forbids preferences.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.