¶2In footnote 1, the main opinion cites Ex parte Tri-StateMotor Transit Co., 541 So.2d 557 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989), as "implicitly" authorizing the review of the denial of Fluor's motion to dismiss in this case. One of the recognized "narrow exceptions" to the principle that mandamus will not lie from the denial of a Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss is that "[t]he question of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'lLife Ins. Co., 888 So.2d 478, 480 (Ala. 2003). A claim seeking an award of benefits under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq., for an injury occurring while the employee worked outside Alabama is not within the cognizance of our trial courts unless one of the conditions specified in § 25-5-35(d) applies; indeed, Alabama courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. Ex parte Fluor Contractors Int'l,772 So.2d 1157, 1159-60 (Ala. 2000).
¶3Although Ex parte Tri-State predates both Ex parteLiberty National and Ex parte Fluor Contractors, its "implicit" reviewability conclusion is wholly consistent with them. I therefore concur in the main opinion.
¶5I concur in the conclusion reached by the majority that the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Morrisette's claim under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-35(d)(2). I write specially to note that Fluor argued in its motion to dismiss and again in its petition for a writ of mandamus that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Morrisette's claim even under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-35(d)(3), because, it said, Fluor is covered by Georgia workers' compensation law. Morrisette did not dispute that fact in his response to Fluor's motion or in his response to Fluor's petition. Thus, I agree with the conclusion that the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under §25-5-35(d)(3). I therefore concur in the issuance of the writ.