Ex Parte State’s Empirical Analysis
2006
Citation profile
5
cited by 5 later decisions
1
states following
June 2014
most recently cited
5 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Taylor v. United States · Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. · United States v. Freeman · 602 So. 2d 344 - IMED Corp. v. Systems Engineering Assoc. · Finch v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"I maintain that a consistent strict construction of § 13A-5-9.1 also requires that jurisdiction vests in `the sentencing judge or presiding judge' to consider motions for sentence reconsideration only when the motion is filed by a `nonviolent convicted offender.' Therefore, if an inmate has been convicted of an offense that is defined by statute as a violent offense, he is a violent offender, and the sentencing judge or the presiding judge does not have jurisdiction to entertain the motion. To the extent this statement conflicts with Kirby , I would overrule Kirby . "Here, Butler was convicted of first-degree rape and first-degree robbery, which are both violent offenses as defined by the legislature, see §§ 12-25-32 (12) and 12-25-32(13)a.10 and a.28, Ala. Code 1975. Butler is a violent offender as a matter of law; consequently, neither the sentencing judge nor the presiding judge had jurisdiction to consider Butler's motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 , Ala. Code 1975. Because in my opinion the court never acquired jurisdiction to consider Butler's motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 , Ala. Code 1975, the court did not have jurisdiction to enter its July 13 order, and that order is void."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Ex Parte Gunn · Gates v. State“In 2000, the Legislature amended the HFOA to allow a sentence to be imposed for certain habitual offenders less severe than life imprisonment without parole under certain circumstances. Specifically, and relevant to this proceeding, § 13A–5–9(c)(3) was amended so that a defendant with three prior felony convictions, none of which was for a Class A felony, who is subsequently convicted of a Class A felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for life or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, in the discretion of the trial court.[1] Before that amendment, a sentence of life imprisonment without 1 Justice Stuart has explained that "the 2000 amendment provided judges with the discretion, when sentencing a defendant, to order the defendant to serve a sentence of life imprisonment when convicted of a fourth felony offense, provided that the fourth felony conviction was not for a Class A felony and the defendant had not previously been convicted of a Class A felony.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“At the time § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, became effective the question arose as to how a circuit court retained the authority to reconsider an inmate's sentence when that court normally loses jurisdiction to modify a defendant's sentence in a criminal case within 30 days of sentencing if a postjudgment motion is not filed.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.