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← 961 P2D 382 - McDougall v. McDougall

McDougall v. McDougall’s Empirical Analysis

1998

Citation profile

3
cited by 3 later decisions
2
states following
October 2015
most recently cited

3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently October 2015

3 state decisions

10199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United Mine Workers of America, Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co. · Patterson v. Patterson · 90 Ill. App. 3d 443 - In Re Marriage of Gryka · Emery v. Emery · 111 Cal. App. 2d 899 - Wendell v. Wendell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The doctrine of estoppel does not validate an otherwise invalid decree. Rather, it imposes a personal disability on the party challenging the decree. It precludes the party from presenting evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity. The application of estoppel in divorce actions has been synthesized by Professor Homer Clark in Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 40 Yale L.J. 45 , 56-57 (1960) as follows: 1) The attack on the divorce is inconsistent with prior conduct of the attacking party. 2) The party upholding the divorce has relied upon it, or has formed expectations based upon it. 38) These relations or expectations will be upset if the divorce is held invalid. The estoppel principle has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 (1982) and by case law. Brockel v. Brockel, 80 SD. 547, 128 N.W.2d 558, 561 (1964) provides: Where a decree of divorce is void, which we do not intimate in this case, parties may be estopped to assert its invalidity to their own advantage if they have enjoyed its fruits. The most common case is where the defendant acts upon the decree by remarrying. Relief is denied in such instances almost without exception. * * * In Patterson v. Patterson, 164 Kan. 501 , 190 P.2d 887 [ (1948) ], the husband obtained a divoree and the wife later remarried. She attempted to set aside the divorce. The court said the wife had treated the divoree "as valid on at least three important occasions (by remarrying). It”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The term “resided” implicates the concept of domicile. Once a domicile is established, it continues until a new one is actually acquired. Duxstad v. Duxstad, 17 Wyo. 411 , 100 P. 112, 114 (1909). A change of address alone does not amount to a change in domicile. Such change must be with the intention of making that place the permanent residence. Id. 100 P. at 114 . This intention, or animus manen-di, has been defined as: [T]he intent to reside in the new place permanently or indefinitely, or to make the new place one’s permanent home, or as the absence of an intention to live elsewhere. It has also been said that there must be (1) an intention to abandon the old domicile, and (2) an intention to acquire a new one. 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 245 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Even though a party may be absent from the state of original domicile, that domicile continues until a new one is adopted. See Duxstad, 100 P. at 114 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.