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← 962 SO2D 1263 - Jones v. State

Jones v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2007

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
1
states following
May 2017
most recently cited

17 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · 895 So. 2d 836 - Bush v. State · 454 So. 2d 468 - Stringer v. State · 691 So. 2d 948 - Herring v. State · 667 So. 2d 1242 - Ballenger v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[w]hen reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. We have stated that on a motion for new trial, the court sits as a thirteenth juror. The motion, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. However, the evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict. A reversal on the grounds that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, "unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict." Rather, as the "thirteenth juror," the court simply disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of opinion does not signify acquittal any more than a disagreement among the jurors themselves. Instead, the proper remedy is to grant a new trial.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “This Court looks at the totality of circumstances to determine whether counsel’s efforts were both deficient and prejudicial. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance [is] highly deferential.” There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Only where it is reasonably probable that but for the attorney’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different, will we find that counsel’s performance was deficient.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “When evaluating the overall performance of counsel, counsel must make strategic discretionary decisions including whether or not to file certain motions, call certain witnesses, ask certain questions or make certain objections.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.