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← 963 F.2d 27 - Dewalt v. Sullivan

Dewalt v. Sullivan’s Empirical Analysis

963 F.2d 27 · 1992

Citation profile

38
cited by 38 later decisions
1
states following
November 2016
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 7 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently November 2016 · most notably United States v. Knox (1994), Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala (1993)

10 federal appellate · 7 district · 1 state decisions

260199220002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Pierce v. Underwood · Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid · Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency · Silberman v. Bogle · Sullivan v. W Sullivan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(A) ... The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that ... attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee____”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Congress thought that $75 an hour was generally quite enough public reimbursement for lawyers' fees, whatever the local or national market might be.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “In Shaw , the Court observed that an interest rate reflects two separate factors, the real opportunity cost of capital and the inflation rate. The Court held that principles of sovereign immunity generally dictate that neither of these elements may be awarded against the United States, regardless of how the award might be designated. An exception to this rule allows for such awards where the government has consented. However, because waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed in favor of the government, the exception is not applicable unless the consent is express and unambiguous. By indexing attorney’s fees at current rates, the district court’s award included interest. Although the EAJA provides for the award of post-judgment interest, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (f), its provisions for a cost of living adjustment is not an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity that would authorize a district court to award pre-judgment interest to compensate for delay. Plaintiffs argue that the EAJA’s provision for an upward adjustment to compensate for an increase in the cost of living constitutes an explicit waiver of the inflation component interest. We agree, but only to the extent that the clause serves as the statute’s built-in mechanism for automatically updating itself, ensuring that the [$125] per hour cap will not be eroded by inflation. We reach this conclusion strictly construing the language in favor of the government, as Shaw requires. Nothing in the remainder of the EAJ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.