¶1dissenting to denial of appellee’s motion for rehearing.
¶2The majority’s denial of rehearing in this case wholly ignores appellant’s argument that the Legislature’s re-enactment of § 5.08(g)(8) of the Texas Medical Practices Act, as Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4495b § 5.08(g)(10), should have been considered on original submission in determining whether appellant’s subjective expectation of privacy in his medical records was one society recognized as reasonable.
¶3I admit to not being aware of the reenactment. Whether the other judges were aware, I will not hazard to guess. However, it seems to me, the legislative action should have been addressed in both the majority and dissenting opinions. When a motion for rehearing brings to the attention of the Court relevant authority that was not considered on original submission, we should not deny the motion out of some sense of embar*532rassment, but rather embrace the motion as an opportunity to provide the bench and bar with a correct, full and cogent analysis and resolution of the issue presented.
¶4Accordingly, I dissent to the denial of appellant’s motion for rehearing.