965 F. Supp. 331 - Clark v. Phillips’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that— (A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiffs rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and (B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation. (2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant. (3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1059 - Jackson v. Austin · 65 F. Supp. 2d 591 - Walker v. Bain

2. “• First, the court should determine whether plaintiff is eligible for an award of attorney fees by determining whether he is a prevailing party under § 1988. • Second, the court should calculate the lodestar method in the ordinary fashion. In making this calculation, however, the court must: (a) limit the hourly rate sought to the lesser of the prevailing market rate (normally applied under § 1988) or the maximum provided in § 1997e(d)(3); and (b) limit the hours sought to only those hours which were “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation- of the plaintiff’s rights” as required by § 1997e(l)(A): • Third, the court should determine whether the amount of the fee determined from the first two steps is proportionate to the relief obtained under § 1997e(d)(l)(B). • Fourth, if a monetary judgment was awarded the court must, in accordance with § 1997e(d)(2), apply some portion of the judgment, not greater than 25%, to satisfy the attorney fee award and limit the total award to 150% of the judgment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 65 F. Supp. 2d 591 - Walker v. Bain

3. “Given Congress’ failure to indicate that “no award” of attorney fees should be paid by a defendant where the award of attorney fees is greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the more reasonable interpretation is that defendant shall pay the entire excess of any award of attorney fees, where the fee award is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment. The “excess” portion of § 1997e(d)(2) simply does not apply to the facts of this case where an award of attorney fees is greater than 150 percent. If Congress intended the PLRA to apply to such a situation, it would have explicitly indicated it in the provision. Because the “excess” portion of § 1997e(d)(2).does not apply to this case, Defendants remain responsible for a reasonable attorney fee, after 25 percent of the Judgment is applied to satisfy the attorney fee award.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 65 F. Supp. 2d 591 - Walker v. Bain