State v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis
1998
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 1 district · 13 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently August 2018
1 federal appellate · 1 district · 13 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Brinegar v. United States · United States v. Matlock · Illinois v. Rodriguez · Griffin v. Wisconsin
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the United States Supreme Court explained that consent to search can be given not only by a defendant, but also by “a third party who possesse [s] common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Id. at 171 , 94 S.Ct. 988 . Common authority to consent to a search rests ... on mutual use of the property. by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Thus, a showing of common authority requires “persuasive evidence of both shared use and joint access or control.” United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir.1992). When a probationer lives with a nonpro-bationer, the common authority rule pronounced in Matlock defines the permissible scope of a probation search. See State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Utah 1987) (“[T]he Matlock doctrine applies with equal force in parole cases.”). In Johnson , the Utah Supreme Court explained: When a parolee lives with a nonparolee, courts generally hold that the cotenancy restricts, to some degree, the extent of a permissible consent search. The scope of consent impliedly given by a cotenant is limited to those parts of the premises ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“). The risk to non[-parolees'] Fourth Amendment rights demands that, when officers conduct a [parole] search where a [parolee] lives with a non[-parolee], the facts available to the officers must support a reasonable belief that the probationer has at least common authority over the area searched. State v. Davis , 965 P.2d 525 , 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ; see also People v. Burgener , 41 Cal.3d 505 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 112 , 714 P.2d 1251 , 1269 (1986) (”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Inasmuch as authority to search the residence of a parolee [or probationer] extends to areas which are jointly controlled with other occupants of the residence, the authority to search these premises necessarily portends a massive intrusion on the privacy interests of third persons solely because they reside with a parolee [or probationer].”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.