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← 969 F.2d 744 - Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Adc III v. O'Melveny & Meyers

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Adc III v. O'Melveny & Meyers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

143
cited by 143 later decisions
4
states following
May 2019
most recently cited

36 federal appellate · 13 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 143 later decisions — most recently May 2019 · most notably Jesinger v. Nevada Federal Credit Union (1994), United States v. $19191000 in US Currency R (1994)

36 federal appellate · 13 district · 4 state decisions

930199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance · Langley v. Federal Deposit Insurance · In re Disbarment of Johnson · Gozlon-Peretz v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 143 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A receiver, like a bankruptcy trustee and unlike a normal successor in interest, does not voluntarily step into the shoes of the bank; it is thrust into those shoes. It was neither a party to the original inequitable conduct nor is it in a position to take action prior to assuming the bank’s assets to cure any associated defects or force the bank to pay for incurable defects. This places the receiver in stark contrast to the normal successor in interest who voluntarily purchases a bank or its assets and can adjust the purchase price for the diminished value of the bank’s assets due to their associated equitable defenses. In such cases, the bank receives less consideration for its assets because of its inequitable conduct, thus bearing the cost of its own wrong. Also significant is the fact that the receiver becomes the bank’s successor as part of an intricate regulatory scheme designed to protect the interests of third parties who also were not privy to the bank’s inequitable conduct. That scheme would be frustrated by imputing the bank’s inequitable conduct to the receiver, thereby diminishing the value of the asset pool held by the receiver and limiting the receiver’s discretion in disposing of the assets. In light of these considerations, we conclude that the equities between a party asserting an equitable defense and a bank are at such variance with the equities between the party and a receiver of the bank that equitable defenses good against the bank should not be availa”
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “only determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
    8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact for trial, and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.