In re Baker-Ricketson Co.’s Empirical Analysis
97 F. 489 · 1899
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 8 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently December 1927
2 federal appellate · 8 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on In re Gutwillig · In re Gutwillig · In re Bruss-Ritter Co. · Blake v. Francis-Valentine Co. · In re Cliffe
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““If the debtor while insolvent ‘suffer or permit’ a creditor to obtain a preference through legal proceedings, or if he permit his property to be ‘concealed or removed’ with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditor, he has committed an act of bankruptcy. But it is not declared to be an act of bankruptcy if he ‘permit’ or ‘suiter’ a receiver to be appointed for the general beneiit of the creditors of a dissolved and insolvent partnership, and this is the most that can he said to he shown by the evidence in this case. Under the act of 18(57 it was held to be an act of bankruptcy to permit the creation of a receivership. But, as Judge Lowell observes in the case of In re Baker-Ricket-son Go., this ruling was based upon section 39 of that act, which made it an act of bankruptcy to ‘procure or suffer his property to be taken on legal process with intent to defeat or delay the operation of this act.’ Under that provision it was held that the appointment of a receiver was legal process. But this provision is not found in the act of 1898, and the language of section 3, subd. 1, is by no means the equivalent of that section. * * Neither has the clause touching a concealment or removal by permission any clear hearing upon the matter of the appointment of a receiver. It would he an abuse of language and a confusion of ideas to hold that the passive conduct of the Yaccaros in respect to the hill seeking a receiver was a concealment or removal with intent to hinder, defraud, or de”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Davis v. Stevens““The provision concerning permission applies only to concealment and removal. That a receivership is the concealment, secretion, falsification, or mutilation of property (see section 1, cl. 22 [U. 9. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418]) the petitioners do not contend. They have not shown that in this case the receiver has removed anything, and the phrase ‘removal of property’ is a totally inapt definition or description of ordinary receivership proceedings. Moreover, the phrase is not a new one, and its meaning may be judged from its use in other bankrupt cases.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““voted, that E. B. Ricketson be authorized in behalf of the Baker-Ricketson Company to appear on behalf of said company in the United States court in -Boston in the event of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy being filed against said company, and on behalf of the company to admit in writing its inability to pay its debts, and its willingness to. he adjudged a bankrupt on that ground.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.