Young v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

72 federal appellate · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 94 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In no event may the fact that a witness has made contradictory state ments be used . . as a basis for completely discarding the rules of evidence against hearsay and ex parte statements, and, as impeachment, opening the flood gates of prejudicial and damaging hearsay.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Culwell v. United States · United States v. Gregory

2. ““The rule in its original and strict form against impeaching one’s own witness is discredited everywhere, and it is generally recognized that impeachment may be resorted to where a witness has surprised the party offering him, by his testimony. The overwhelming weight of authority however, supports the rule that though trial courts should, in the exercise of a sound discretion to prevent injury from the surprise testimony of a hostile or corrupt witness, permit cross examination and impeachment by contradictory statements, it is never permitted to make of the rules an artifice by which inadmissible matter may be gotten to a jury through the device of offering a witness, whose testimony is known to be adverse, in order, under the name of impeachment, to get before the jury for its weighing, favorable ex parte statements the witness has made. To the relaxation of the rule against impeaching one’s own witness by introducing his ex parte statement in contradiction of his testimony, it is fundamental, we think, that the party offering the witness be really surprised at his testimony.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Askew v. Commonwealth

3. “This distinction should be delineated sharply in terms readily understandable by the jury. It is not done by simply stating that it is to be used `as a matter of impeachment going to his credibility' or the further suggestion that it is to be used to determine whether Hardy `was telling the truth when he was first called on the stand or not.' Note 6, supra. Assuming the jury understood what was `impeachment going to his credibility' the instruction did not advise the jury what they were to do if, as the charge permitted, they determined that the ex parte statement showed Hardy was untruthful on the witness stand. Nothing forbade its further use to establish the critical facts at issue and therein stated categorically. `[W]hile the court stated that they were offered for impeachment [purposes] only, this was all that was said, and the jury was allowed to take the whole matter without explanation or instructions as to what was meant by "for impeachment purposes only.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 348 So. 2d 858 - Randolph v. State