Phelps v. Dawson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 1 district · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The question here is whether a deputy Fire Marshal in making such a charge (if he was of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to charge any person with arson) is liable for damages if he does so without probable cause and with malice. The answer must be that he is not. The reason is that, in instituting such a charge, he is acting in a so-called quasi-judicial capacity connected with the enforcement of the criminal law. Broadly speaking, it is his official duty to institute such proceedings. His action in so doing is, under the statute, to be the result of his honest judgment based upon the results of his investigation. He has a choice — sometimes called a ‘discretion’ — to initiate or not to initiate such a criminal proceeding. The public welfare requires that this choice shall be free of all fear of personal liability. To assure this freedom of action it is deemed best to make that assurance positive and definite by securing him against even actions based upon a malicious abuse of his official power.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 77 F. Supp. 629 - Gibson v. Reynolds · Butt v. McEvoy

2. “... The sole basis of such immunity is a public policy resting entirely upon the public good to be brought about by having the official action of certain classes of public officials entirely uninfluenced by apprehension of personal civil liability, [citations omitted] To allow recovery against the surety as to such official acts would (a) result in weakening (if not entirely destroying) the effectiveness of this public policy or (b) it would make it burdensome or impossible to secure official bonds. ... It is a matter of general knowledge that there are decided practical advantages in having as surety on official bonds companies which made a business of such suretyship. It is equally well known that such companies nearly always have contracts of reimbursement from the principal upon such bonds. If they have no such contracts, the law implies such, [citations omitted] ... Therefore, the situation is that, if the surety has to pay, it turns back upon the principal—the immune official—for full reimbursement. Thus the official is liable, in a roundabout way, for the official action which this rule of public policy declares he shall not be liable for directly. Such a situation weakens, if it does not destroy, all real effect of the public policy. 97 F.2d at 342-343 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

3. ““* * * The immunity given the principals of these bonds is in no sense a personal privilege nor is it one arising from any legal incapacity in them. The sole basis of such immunity is a public policy resting entirely upon the public good to be brought about by having the official action of certain classes of public officials entirely uninfluenced by apprehension of personal civil liability. [Citations omitted.] To allow recovery against the surety as to such official acts would (a) result in weakening (if not entirely destroying) the effectiveness of this public policy or (b) it would make it burdensome or impossible to secure official bonds. * * “We think the proper course to pursue is to extend this immunity to the surety. By so doing, the full effect of the purpose of this public policy will be preserved.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 44 Ohio App. 3d 186 - Hopkins v. INA Underwriters Insurance