97 Ill. App. 3d 407 - People v. Edwards’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Motion for continuance, (a) The defendant or the State may move for a continuance. If the motion is made more than 30 days after arraignment the court shall require that it be in writing and supported by affidavit. * * * (c) A written motion for continuance made by the State more than 30 days after arraignment may be granted when: * * * (2) A material witness is unavailable and the prosecution will be prejudiced by the absence of his testimony; however this shall not be a ground for continuance if the defendant will stipulate that the testimony of the witness would be as alleged; * * * (d) The court may upon written motion of either party or upon the court’s own motion order a continuance for grounds not stated in subsections (b) and (c) of this Section if he finds that the interests of justice so require. (e) All motions for continuance are addressed to the discretion of the trial court and shall be considered in the light of the diligence shown on the part of the movant. Where 1 year has expired since the filing of an information or indictments, filed after January 1, 1980, if the court finds that the State has failed to use due diligence in bringing the case to trial, the court may, after a hearing had on the cause, on its own motion, dismiss the information or indictment. Any demand that the defendant had made for a speedy trial under Section 103 — 5 of this code shall not abate if the State files a new information or the grand jury reindicts in the cause. After a hearin”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 222 Ill. App. 3d 1089 - People v. Harris · 360 Ill. Dec. 795 - People v. Martinez

2. “The `trials' conducted below were essentially the same in all 11 cases. Upon the trial court's denial of the State's motion for continuance which was requested in most of the cases, and its further denial of the State's motion to nol-pros in all 11 cases, the court on its own initiative swore in the defendant, asked several preliminary questions, and found the defendant not guilty without further evidence. The State did not participate in any of the trials except as to the defendant Bibbs, wherein the prosecutor's attempt to question Bibbs was disallowed on objection by defense counsel. We conclude that the `trials' below in all 11 cases were shams. Each was an artifice employed by the trial judge to achieve the result of a dismissal with prejudice for want of prosecution. [Citations.] As held in Edwards , the fact that a defendant testifies is not a sufficient distinction from the other similar circumstances in Deems to warrant a departure from the rationale of the court in Deems . There were no trials. The State did not attempt to convict the defendants and, therefore, the `acquittals' amounted to dismissals which are appealable by the State pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 360 Ill. Dec. 795 - People v. Martinez

3. “"This is not a case where a trial court evaluated the government's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction [citation], but one in which the government presented no evidence whatsoever upon which the trial court could have based any evaluation at all. In short, there simply was no trial. In our opinion, therefore, this situation is analogous to that in [ Deems ] * * *." Id. at 411-12 , 52 Ill.Dec. 908 , 422 N.E.2d 1117 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 360 Ill. Dec. 795 - People v. Martinez