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97 Mass. 72

Morrison v. Chapin

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided September 15, 1867

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1867-09-15

Tobt for trespass on real estate. At the trial in the superior court, before Wilkinson, J., it appeared that the land in dispute was woodland, fenced on three sides and part of the way on the fourth by an ancient fence, and having monuments at each of the four corners ; that it had for forty years at least been' a well-understood distinct piece of land, about five acres in area; and that there was open and cleared land adjoining on the three sides fenced.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1867-09-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1985

12 state decisions

301867187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Bigelow, C. J.

¶1We can see no valid ground of exception to the several rulings to which objection was taken by the plaintiffs at the trial.

¶21. The instruction as to the acquisition of a title by disseisin, for which the plaintiffs asked, was rightly refused. The demanded premises consisted of a wood-lot. It had never been entirely inclosed by a fence. A portion of one side had always been open, and the fences on the other sides were erected between the lot in question and land which was cleared, and may have been placed there for the purpose of inclosing these adjacent lots, and not in order to indicate possession and ownership of the wood-lot. Whether the fences had been erected for the latter purpose was a question of fact for the jury in connection with the other evidence in the case. It would have been erroneous for the court to pronounce on its effect as establishing a title by disseisin. Such would have been the result if the request of the plaintiffs had been complied with. The whole evidence bearing on the question of disseisin was rightly left to the jury under instructions which were in conformity to adjudicated cases. Slater v. Jepherson, 6 Cush. 129. Coburn v. Hollis, 8 Met. 125. Ewer v. Lovell, 9 Gray, 276.

¶32. The testimony of the witness Parker was clearly competent There was sufficient proof of the loss of the paper to render secondary evidence of its contents admissible. As the case is *77stated in the exceptions we must assume that the evidence was given under the rule laid down by the court; that is, from the recollection of the witness aided by memoranda which he knew to have been made by himself contemporaneously with the execution of the written agreement. This is a correct statement of the rule, and the testimony was rightly admitted. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 437.

¶43. The record of the action against Jonathan Morrison was admissible for two purposes: first, as tending to contradict his testimony which had been introduced by the plaintiff; second, as in the nature of an admission in disparagement of title by one with whom the plaintiffs claimed to be in privity as grantees of the estate in controversy. Doe v. Pettett, 5 B. & Ald. 223. Brattle Square Church v. Bullard, 2. Met. 363, 368.

¶54. Those portions of the answers to certain cross-interrogatories in the deposition of Morrison which were ruled out by the court were not responsive to the questions and were rightly excluded as irrelevant and impertinent.

¶6Exceptions overruled.

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