Volume 97 — Maryland Reports

<p>A contract for the sale of a quantity of canned goods which designates the price per dozen and adds, “terms cash less one and one-half per cent,” does not mean that the buyer has the option of either paying cash less the discount or of*paying at the expiration of the customary period of credit for such goods without the discount, but the contract itself fixes the payment as cash with the discount allowed, there being no evidence in the case as to any usage of the trade affecting the construction of the language used.</p> <p>A contract for the sale of goods made in Baltimore between a seller residing there and a buyer residing in New Orleans provided as follows : “Terms cash * Buyer to give shipping instructions when requested by seller. To be delivered as packed during season of 1901, f. o. b. Baltimore. ’ ’ Held, that the seller was entitled to demand payment in Baltimore upon delivery of the goods for shipment and that the buyer had no right to require delivery to him in New Orleans and an opportunity to inspect the goods there before making payment, but should make such inspection as he desired in Baltimore which was designated in the contract as the place of delivery.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court (Sharp, J.), where there was a verdict and judgment thereon for plaintiff for' $2,000.</p>

<p>Public Schools—Apportionment by Comptroller of Fund for Colored Schools—Construction of Code, Art. 77.</p> <p>Code, Art. 77, sec. 98, provides that/‘the Comptroller shall apportion the sura appropriated for the support of the colored schools of the several counties and the city of Baltimore in proportion to their respective population between the ages of five and twenty years.” And sec. 102 of said article directs the Comptroller to apportion the amount levied for schools by taxation to the several counties and the city of Baltimore in proportion to their respective population between the ages of five and twenty years. Appellant’s petition for a mandamus in this case alleged that the Comptroller’s practice has been to apportion the sum distributable under sec. 98 according to the colored population of the counties of school age, and the sum distributable under sec. 102 according to the entire population of the counties of school age, including both white and colored ; and the petition asked that the Comptroller be asked to apportion the school fund under sec. 102, according to the white population of the counties of school age instead of according to the entire population of that age. Held, that the language of the two sections is so similar that the same construction must be placed upon both ; that the construction asked for by the petitioner could not be made without inserting the word white before the word population in section 102 and the word colored before the word population in section 98 ; that the two sections plainly direct the Comptroller to distribute both funds according to the entire population of the counties between the ages of five and twenty years.</p>

<p> Registration of Pharmacists—Action of State Board of Pharmacy Not Reviewable by the Courts. </p> <p>The Act of 1902, ch. 179, created a State Board of Pharmacy and required all persons practicing pharmacy or conducting retail drug stores to be registered by the Board. In the case of applicants for registration who had not carried on a drug business for five years the Board was directed to grant certificates of registration after a technical examination of the applicant, but the Act directedfthat “any person who at the passage of this Act is actively engaged as owner or manager or is and has been so engaged as clerk for five years or more and has reached the age of twenty-one years in compounding drugs and dispensing physicians’ prescriptions in one of the counties of this State, and who shall on or before the first day of July next forward to the Md. Board of Pharmacy an affidavit to that effect together with a fee of one dollar shall be entitled to registration as pharmacists and to a certificate of such registration.”</p> <p>Plaintiff’s bill in this case alleged that he was a member of the Board of Pharmacy and that the other members of the Board, against his protest, had issued a certificate of registration to a person as a pharmacist, without an examination, who had not practiced pharmacy for five years and was not duly qualified. The bill prayed for an injunction requiring the Board to cancel this registration and prohibiting them from granting such certificate to the person named. There was no allegation that the Board acted corruptly or had neglected to consider whether the party in question came within the description of the Act. Held, that the action of the Board in the registration of applicants was not purely ministerial but required the exercise of judgment and discretion in ascertaining whether an applicant was in fact entitled under the Act to registration without an examination, and that the exercise of this discretion by the Board cannot be controlled bj' the Courts in this proceeding.</p>

<p> Appeal Before Final Jtidgment—Agreement of Counsel—One foint Maker of Note not Bound by Admissions of Other Maker. </p> <p>An appeal was taken from the rulings of the trial Court after a verdict of the jury but when there had been no final judgment in the case. An agreement of counsel was filed in this Court that hearing should be had and judgment rendered to the same effect as if final judgment had been regularly entered of record in the Court below. Held, that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the cause until after final judgment and that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement of counsel.</p> <p>One of two joint makers of a promissory note is not bound by the admissions of the other maker or by the latter’s waiver of a defense to the note.</p>

<p>Power of Disposition Annexed to Estate for Life—Deed of Trust in Excess of the Power—Family Corporation—Shares of Stock in Names of Husband and Wife as foint Tenants—Sale of Corporate Property by Real Owner—Acquiescence by Nominal Shareholders—■ Alo gift of Securities by Husband to Wife by Renting Safe Deposit Box in foint Names with Equal Right of Access—Deed of Trust Valid in Part and Void in Part.</p> <p>A testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife for the term of her natural life with full power to her to sell, mortgage, lease and transfer the said property, or any part thereof and to deal with the same for her sole benefit and at her sole discretion. By a subsequent clause of the will the testator provided that upon the death of his wife, the residue of his estate then being should be divided into equal shares and distributed to his children. Held, that the testator did not intend that his wife should have the power to dispose of the estate in such a way as to defeat the remainders to his children, but the powers annexed to her life estate related to the management of the estate, and that consequently she was not empowered to execute a deed of trust of the property by which, upon her death, the testator’s children take merely equitable life estates with remainders over to their respective children, instead of the full beneficial ownership given by the testator.</p> <p>The owner of a brewery transferred the property and business to a corporation and caused a few of the shares of stock to be put in the names ' of his children and the greater part to be put in the names of himself and his wife as joint tenants. No consideration was paid by any of these persons for such shares of stock and the owner of the brewery continued to deal with the corporation and the shares as his own property and this course of dealing was acquiesced in by the other shareholders. Subsequently the brewery was sold to a syndicate and all of the shares of stock so issued were transferred to the purchaser with the acquiescence of the shareholders, and the purchase price was paid in money and securities to the owner of the brewery. He then gave to his children sums of money in excess of the value of the shares of stock held by them. Held, that upon his death, his widow did not become entitled to any part of the money or securities paid for the brewery in consequence of having been designated as joint tenant of the shares of stock held by her husband in the manner above mentioned.</p> <p>A man rented a box in a safe deposit company in the names of himself and wife under an agreement which set forth that they held it “ as joint tenants the survivor to have access thereto in case of the death of either.” He gave to his wife one of the two keys to the box and retained the other and either of them could have access to the box separately. The bonds and other valuables which were put into the box were then the property of the husband. He frequently said when speaking of himself and his wife that whoever lived the longest should have everything that was left. Upon the death of the husband it was contended that the securities in the box had passed to the wife by way of gift. Held, that the husband had made no perfected gift of this property because he retained the power during his lifetime to deal with it as he pleased, and the mere fact that his wife had a right of access to the box did not operate to change the title to the contents of the box or constitute a complete delivery of possession and dominion to her and a parting with dominion by the husband.</p> <p>The real owner of all of the shares of stock of a corporation, although some of them were in the names of members of his family, sold the business of the corporation and all of the shares were transferred to the purchaser. After his death certain property was found to remain in the name of this corporation. Held, that this property belongs to the estate of the deceased owner and that the members of his family who had been shareholders in the corporation had no power to transfer it.</p> <p>A tenant for life of property with power of sale, etc., annexed conveyed this property to a trust company in trust for herself for life with certain remainders over. The provisions in the conveyances as to these remainders were invalid because not authorized by the will under which the property was given to the tenant for life. The deed of trust also conveyed property which belonged absolutely to the grantor. Held, that the deed was valid as to this latter property and also as to the grantor’s life estate in the other property but was invalid as to the remainders thereafter attempted to be created.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Stocicbridge, J.)</p>

<p> Contributory Negligence—Attempt to Cross Tracks in Front of an Electric Car in Open Country Seen to be Approaching. </p> <p>The deceased drove slowly after dark towards the tracks of a suburban electric railway. The road lay through open fields, and the cars ran there at a high rate of speed. The view was unobstructed and the deceased saw the headlight of an approaching car but supposing that he could cross in time continued to drive on as before and a collision occurred which caused his death. There was evidence to the effect that a red light was displayed at the crossing which was a signal that the car should stop there before crossing the road and that this signal was disobeyed by the motorman who also neglected to sound the gong. Held, that the contributory negligence of the deceased in thus attempting to cross in front of a rapidly approaching car which he clearly saw was such as to bar recovery in this action to recover damages for his death, and that in the absence of any evidence that the deceased saw the red light and knew what it meant as a signal, it cannot be assumed that he was misled by it.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas (Harlan, C. J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from Baltimore City Court (Stockbridge, J.)</p>

<p> Injunction to Restrain Violation of Municipal Ordinance—Stables—Nuisance. </p> <p>The violation of a municipal ordinance will not be restrained by injunction at the instance of a party who does not show that such violation will work some special or irreparable injury to him.</p> <p>Since a stable for horses in a city or village is not a nuisance per se, the erection of one will not be enjoined merely because it may become a nuisance from the way in which it may be managed.</p> <p>Equity will not enjoin the erection of a stable for horses on the line of a city street although a municipal ordinance provides that no stable shall be built within twenty feet of a street, in the absence of evidence that the stable will be a nuisance to adjoining owners, or will cause special and irreparable injury to their property.</p>

<p>Appeal from Baltimore City Court (Sharp, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas (Harlan, C. J.)</p>

<p> Construction of a Will—Bequest to Descendants. </p> <p>When there is a bequest to the descendants of certain persons the general rule is that all the descendants of every degree, living at the time of distribution, take equal shares per capita.</p> <p>A testator gave the residue of his estate to trustees with directions to pay the income thereof to his three daughters during their natural lives, and provided that upon the death of any of his daughters her share should pass to her issue, &c., and in case any of his daughters should die without issue living at her death “then her share shall pass to her surviving sisters and their descendants.” The testator also declared his intent that “the whole of the shares thus bequeathed shall ultimately vest in the descendants of my daughters, or any of them who shall leave descendants, in which case distribution shall be made among such descendants per capita and not per stirpes, and the descendants of my daughters aforesaid are to be considered as purchasers, and as such entitled to the principal or property itself from the time their rights respectively vest.” One of the testator’s daughters predeceased him leaving children. A second daughter died after the testator also leaving children. Then the third daughter died leaving no issue. At that time there were living both children and grandchildren of the other two daughters Held, that the share of the daughter thus dying without issue should now be divided equally per capita among the living .descendants, both children and grandchildren, of the two daughters who had previously died.</p>

<p> Local Practice—Denial of Signature of Note in Affidavit to Plea. </p> <p>Code, Public General Laws, Art. 75, sec. 108, provides that whenever the execution of any written instrument is alleged in the pleadings the same shall be taken to be admitted for the purposes of the action unless denied by the next succeeding pleading of the opposite party. But the Act of 1890, ch. 136, provides that in any suit in the Circuit Court for Carroll County, if there shall be filed with the declaration in the cause, any paper purporting to be signed by any defendant therein, the fact of the genuineness of such signature shall be deemed to be admitted for the purposes of the cause unless the affidavit to the plea shall further state that the affiant knows that such signature was not written by the person whose signature it purports to be. In an action in Carroll County on a promissory note alleged to have been executed b}' the defendant as a joint and several maker, the defendant filed the general issue pleas and in the affidavit filed therewith denied that the note sued on was signed by him or with his authority. Held, that in a suit under the local Act it was not necessary for the defendant to deny the genuineness of the signature in his plea, but the denial of the same in the affidavit was sufficient, and that consequently in this case evidence to show that the note was a forgery was admissible under the general issue plea.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Wickes, J.)</p>

<p> Landlord and Tenant—Parol Agreement Varying Lease Under Seal-Right of Landlord to Re-Let Premises Vacated by Tenant Before Expiration of Term—Surrender of Premises Not Accepted by Landlord. </p> <p>After the execution of a lease under seal for a term of years, the lessor agreed by parol that the rent should be reduced for the period of six months. The lessee subsequently paid the rent as reserved in the original lease. In an action of covenant to recover the rent thereafter accruing, held, that there had been no such waiver or alteration of the original lease as to defeat the lessor’s right to sue in covenant.</p> <p>Before the expiration of his term a tenant left the premises and sent the keys to the landlord. The tenant was notified that the landlord, without abandoning any right, would rent the property, crediting the tenant with any rent collected and holding him liable for any balance due under the lease. The landlord then took possession of the property, made certain repairs and rented it from time to time. In an action to recover the balance of the rent due under the lease less the sums received from other parties, held, that the reletting of the property, although without the tenant’s assent, was not the acceptance of a surrender of the term, or an ouster of the tenant, and that the latter is liable for the rent under the covenants of the lease.</p> <p>A surrender of the demised premises by a tenant before the expiration of the term does not relieve him from liability for rent unless the surrender is accepted by the landlord.</p>

<p> Railway Company Incorporated Under the General Law Not Authorized to Bridge Navigable Streams Withoiit Legislative Assent—Construction of Code. </p> <p>Code, Art. 23, sec. 177, provides that whenever the line of any railway company shall cross any navigable water, the company shall file the plan of the bridge, &c., with the Board of Public Works for its approval ; and a right of appeal to the Circuit Court is given in the event of a disapproval of the plan by the Board. Code, Art. 23, sec. 92, provides that no bridge shall be erected on a navigable stream unless authorized by an Act of the General Assembly. A railway company incorporated under the general law, which gives no express grant of power to railway companies to cross navigable waters, filed a petition for a mandamus in this case, asking that the Board of Public Works be required to take action upon the plans submitted to it under section 177 aforesaid for bridges crossing certain navigable streams. Held, that under sec. 92 it is necessary for a railway company incorporated under the general law to obtain special legislative authority to construct a bridge across a navigable stream, and that the purpose of sec. 177 was not to grant the power to railway companies incorporated under Article 23 to bridge navigable streams but to regulate the method of constructing bridges by companies possessing the right to build them.</p> <p>The particular heading under which a provision is found in the Code is entitled to little weight in its construction.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Dennis, J.)</p>

<p> Polhdion of Watercourse—Injunction—Pollution Contributed to by Plaintiff—Laches. </p> <p>The fact that a riparian owner constructs a lake along the bed of a stream flowing through his land and uses the water so collected for the purposes of a hospital does not disentitle him to maintain a suit to prevent the pollution of the stream by an upper riparian owner, when it is not shown that lower riparian owners are injured by such diversion of the water, or that they have not assented to such use.</p> <p>It is no defense to a bill to restain the pollution of a stream of water that the plaintiff polluted another steam flowing upon the land of third parties.</p> <p>When a bill charges the pollution of a stream by the defendant’s emptying into it sewage from water closets, Ihefact that a hogpen on plaintiff’s land also contributed to the contamination of the water in a different way, is no bar to a relief against the defendant.</p> <p>The fact that other persons also cause the pollution of a stream is no defense to a bill to restrain that caused by the defendant.</p> <p>The plaintiff, a corporation maintaining a hospital, owns a tract of land through which flows a stream of water that was formerly pure. The corporation constructed a lake on its land to accumulate the water and pumped it thence into the hospital. The water had been so used for a number of years when the defendant company, an upper riparian owner, built sewers and drains which emptied refuse and sewage from water closets into the stream polluting it to such an extent that its use became dangerous to health. Upon a bill for an injunction to restrain defendant from so contaminating the water, held,</p> <p>ist. That there is no evidence to show that the construction of the lake and the use of the water by the plaintiff injured lower riparian owners and plaintiff is not disentitled in equity to ask for relief against the defendant, an upper riparian owner.</p> <p>2nd. That neither the circumstance that the sewage from plaintiff’s hospital is emptied into another stream and discharged upon the land of third parties, nor that a hog pen on plaintiff’s land also defiled the stream, nor that other parties also contributed to the pollution of the water, constitutes any equitable ground for denying relief to the plaintiff.</p> <p>3rd. That plaintiff’s delay in applying for the injunction in this case until after the construction of its sewerage system by the defendant is not such laches as to be a defense to the bill.</p>

<p> County Commissioners Not Liable for Injury Resulting From Defective' Condition of Highway After Enactment of Statute Depriving Them of Control Over Roads. </p> <p>Under the provisions of Code, Art. 25, it has been held to be the general law in this State that both the power and the duty to keep the public roads in safe condition for travel were imposed upon the County Commissioners in each county and that they were therefore liable in damages to parties injured in consequence of the non-repair of such roads or the existence of dangerous obstructions upon them. But the Act of 1900, ch. 685. enacted a special local law for Baltimore County, which almost entirely deprived the Commissioners of that county of control over the public roads therein and created a Board of Road Commissioners for each district who ‘ ‘shall take charge of all roads and bridges in their respective districts and shall see that no obstructions or injury is permitted upon any road or bridge under their supervision.” The Road Commissioners are not subject to the control of the County Commissioners in connection with the repair of roads, but are required to report to an independent official appointed by the Governor and known as the Road Engineer; and the formerly existing power of the County Commissioners to levy taxes to be expended upon roads is so restricted as to deprive them of their discretion in this respect. After the enactment of this local law, the plaintiff was injured by an obstruction improperly placed upon a road of said county and brought this action against the County Commissioners to recover damages therefor. Held, that since the local law, which prevails over the general law because in conflict with it, had deprived the County Commissioners of the powers and duties which had constituted the ground upon which they had been held liable for such injuries, this liability no longer exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas (Harlan, C. J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wicomico County (Holland, J.)</p>

<p> Insufficient Affidavit to Bill for an Injunction—Error as to Name in Tax Assessment—Bill to Enjoin Collection of Tax. </p> <p>The affidavit to a bill asking for an injunction is insufficient when it is not made by the plaintiff but by one not a party to the cause who simply swears that the matters stated in the bill are true to the best of his knowledge and belief, but does not inform the Court as to the source of his information or what knowledge he has on the subject.</p> <p>When property owned by the Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co. is erroneously assessed to the Chesapeake Beach Improvement Co., the former company, having knowledge of the assessment, is not entitled to apply for an injunction to restrain the collection of the tax on the property, but should apply to the proper authorities to correct the error.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s bill for an injunction to restrain the collection of a tax alleged that on May 31st, 1901, he had purchased certain real estate from the Chesapeake Ry. Co.; that the defendants, the County Commissioners, at their annual session in 1901 had assessed the property for taxation to the Chesapeake Improvement Co., but had not notified said company or the plaintiff of the assessment. Held, upon demurrer, that the bill was properly dismissed since it does not allege when the assessment was made, or that plaintiff was then the owner of the land, or that the Chesapeake Ry. Co. from whom plaintiff purchased the property, was not duly notified of the assessment.</p>

<p>Appeal from Baltimore City Court (Sharp, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Garrett County (Boyd, C. J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from Baltimore City Court (Dennis, J.)</p>

<p>The plaintiff company, in reply to an inquiry from defendant, offered to sell one hundred tons of'tack plate rolled in grooves at designated prices for different sizes. Defendant replied: “Enter our order for one hundred tons tack plate at price quoted, specifications to follow.” Defendant afterwards refused to give any directions as to the sizes required. In an action alleging a breach of contract, held, that no definite and complete contract had been made since the reservation to the defendant of the right to designate subsequently what particular sizes of tack he would take, caused an essential term of the agreement to be lacking.</p> <p>In the above case, defendant’s agent, after the correspondence had occurred, orally promised to send specifications. Held, that this promise did not give validity to the Incomplete contract sued on.</p>

<p> Amendment of Voucher in Attachment Against Non-Resident—Appeal. </p> <p>The voucher originally filed in an attachment suit against a non-resident described the debt as due to the estate of P. C., deceased. Afterwards the trial Court allowed the plaintiffs to amend the voucher by adding a certificate of letters testamentary on the estate of P. C. granted to them, and by describing the defendant’s account as due to them as executors. Held, that the order allowing the amendment to be made was properly passed, since the Act of 1898, ch. 44, expressly provides that the voucher as well as all the other papers in attachment proceedings may be amended in the same manner as the proceedings in other actions at law.</p> <p>No appeal lies from an order allowing the plaintiffs in an attachment suit to amend the voucher filed with the declaration because, under the Act of 1898, ch. 44, such an order is within the discretion of the trial Court, and also because the order is not a final determination.</p>

<p> Affidavit to Plea Under Baltimore City Practice Act—On Contract by Agent For Undisclosed Principal Suit May be Against Either Bid Not Both—Special Plea of Estoppel. </p> <p>The Practice Act of Baltimore City (1898, ch. 123, sec. 312), provides that in certain actions ex contractu the plaintiff shall be entitled to a speedy judgment unless the defendant’s pleas contain a good defense and be supported by his affidavit stating that the pleas are true and the defendant shall further state the amount of the plaintiff’s demand if anything admitted to be due or owing and the amount disouted, and that he will be able to produce evidence in support of the plea as to the portion disputed. In this case defendant’s affidavit to his pleas stated that every plea was true and all of the plaintiff’s alleged claim was disputed. Held, that this affidavit is in compliance with the statute.</p> <p>The general rule, subject to few exceptions, is that when an agent contracts in his own name for his principal, without disclosing him, the other party to the contract may, upon discovery of the principal, sue either the agent or the principal, but after he has sued one and a final judgment has been rendered, he cannot bring an action against the other, whether the judgment in the first suit was for or against the plaintiff.</p> <p>In an action to recover the price of goods sold, the defendant filed the general issue pleas and a special plea to the effect that he acted as agent of X in purchasing the goods sued for and that the plaintiff had elected to sue X for said goods and had recovered judgment against him therefor. Held, that a demurrer to this plea was properly overruled, because even if the facts therein alleged could be admissible in evidence under the general issue pleas, yet, since the plea admits the purchase of the goods alleged in the declaration, but sets up the judgmentagainst defendant’s principal of a defense, it is good as a special plea of confession and avoidance; and it is also good because it relies upon an estoppel of record created by an adjudication and such an estoppel should be made the subject of a special plea.</p>

<p> Affidavit to Bill For an Injunction—Removal of Building. </p> <p>The affidavit to a bill asking for an injunction is insufficient when it is not made by'the plaintiff but by one not a party to the cause who merely swears that the matters stated in the bill are true to the best of his knowledge and belief, but does not inform the Court as to the source of his information or what knowledge he has on the subject.</p> <p>A bill for a mandatory injunction requiring defendant to bring back to certain land a structure which he had removed therefrom, which does not allege that the structure was a permanent fixture, is properly dismissed when the case is heard upon a bill alone without evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Merrick, J.)</p>

<p>Malicious Prosecution—Evidence— Want of Probable Cause.</p> <p>In an action for malicious prosecution, defendant’s agent, who had caused the plaintiff to be arrested, was called as a witness by the plaintiff to prove that the agent had made the arrest in accordance with defendant’s instructions. He was asked on cross-examination if he had any malice towards the plaintiff. Held, that this question was competent since the word “malice” was not used in its legal sense but in its colloquial meaning of personal hatred or ill will, and the defendant was entitled to show that its agent was not actuated by any feeling of ill will in order to exclude an inference of malice in fact.</p> <p>The same witness was also asked on cross-examination what were the facts which led him to obtain the warrant upon which plaintiff was arrested. Held, that this question was proper because the facts inquired about directly related to the issue whether the arrest was justifiable.</p> <p>Whether the facts proven in an action of malicious prosecution show that the defendant had reasonable ground for believing that the plaintiff was guilty of the offence for which he was arrested, is a question of law for the Court, and the circumstance that the plaintiff was afterwards acquitted of the charge does not show that there was a want of probable cause for his arrest.</p> <p>Defendant’s agent caused the arrest of the plaintiff upon the charge of being unlawfully on the cars of the defendant in violation of the Act of 1892, ch. 397. Held, upon the facts of the case that defendant’s agent had reasonable ground to believe that the plaintiff was guilty and that therefore the jury was properly instructed that there was not legally sufficient evidence of want of probable cause.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas (Harlan, C. J.)</p>

<p> Practice Act of Baltimore City—Incorporating Contract Sued on in the Declaration is a Filing of Contract—Appeal. </p> <p>The Practice Act of Baltimore City (Act of 1898, ch. 123, secs. 312 and 313) provides that the plaintiff in an action on a contract shall be entitled to a speedy judgment if he makes affidavit to his claim and if he shall file with-his declaration the bond, promissory note or other writ- , ing or account by which- the defendant is indebted, unless the defend- , ant’s pleas be good and be verified by a certain affidavit. In this case ' the plaintiff sued on a written contract signed by the defendant and certain promissory nótes'executed by'him. The contract was set forth in full in the declaration-and- the notes were filed with.it. -Defendant’s affidavit to his pleas was defective under the statute and plaintiff obtained a judgment by default which defendant moved to strike out because the writing by which it was alleged in the declaration that the defendant was indebted was not filed with the declaration. The appeal was taken from an order overruling this motion. Held, that the incorporation of the contract sued on in the body of the declaration was a filing of the contract with the declaration within the true meaning of the statute.</p> <p>Orders passed by a trial Court cannot be brought up for review in this Court by means of an agreement of counsel, but must form part of bills of exception or of the duly certified record.</p>

<p> Purchaser of Land Entitled to Maintain Suit to Reform a Deed Executed by His Grantor—Mistake in Deed—loaches—Mortgagee of Land to be Protected From Loss When Deed is Reformed. </p> <p>The purchaser of a lot of ground from an owner who had reserved a right of way over adjacent land for the benefit of the first mentioned lot, is entitled to maintain a bill against the grantee of the adjacent land to establish the right of way as reserved and to reform a confirmatory deed executed by his grantor so as to make it conform to the intention of the parties.</p> <p>A bill in equity alleged that A had granted a lot of ground to the defendant and in the deed of conveyance a certain right of way over the lot had been reserved for the benefit of an adjoining lot belonging to A; that subsequently defendant had -represented to A that a confirmatory deed was necessary to correct an error of description in this deed, and that A had executed the confirmatory deed without knowing that in addition to correcting the error in the description it also changed the location of the roadway, that afterwards plaintiff had purchased the-adjoining lot for the benefit of which the right of -way had been reserved; that the location of the roadway in the confirmatory deed was a mistake and that both parties intended it should be located as in the first deed The prayer of the bill'was for the reformation of the confirmatory deed so as to make it accord with the actual agreement of the parties. Held, upon demurrer, that the allegations of the bill are such that the defendant should be required to answer and the plaintiff have an opportunity to prove the facts alleged.</p> <p>Laches is not a defense to a suit to reform a deed instituted ten years after its execution and seven years after plaintiff acquired title to the property which gave him the right to bring the suit, when the bill alleges that the plaintiff had made repeated overtures to the defendant for an amicable adjustment of the controversy 'which had not been definitely-rejected until shortly before the bill was filed, and that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the delay. .</p> <p>When a bill is filed to reform a deed so as to change the location of a right of way over certain land, a subsequent mortgagee of the land is entitled to be protected from any loss caused to him by the reformation of the deed.</p>

<p>■ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (■Revele,’ J.)</p>

) The agreement referred to in the opinion of the Court is as follows : This agreement made this 8th day of April, in the year 1897, by and between George P. Willey, hereinafter styled the principal, and William O. Nelson, hereinafter styled the agent: Witnesseth : Whereas the principal is about to engage in the business of manufacturing canned goods at his factory, situate at Patuxent, Anne Arundel County, Maryland, and desires to constitute the agent as his sole…

<p>Negligence—Carriers—Alighting From Standing Street Car Not at Regular Stopping Place—Knowledge By Conductor of Passenger's Position—Street Railway Regulation—Insiructiotis to the Jury— Appeal.</p> <p>Upon appeal from a ruling of the trial Court either admitting in evidence or rejecting a written instrument, the writing itself, or so much of it as is necessary to enable this Court to ascertain its legal effect, must be incorporated in the record, so that this Court may be enabled to determine whether it was relevant and if the appellant was injured by the action of the trial Conrt.</p> <p>In an action against a street railway company .for an injury caused by the premature starting of a car while the plaintiff was getting off, the defendant offered to show a regulation requiring its motorman to stop in front of the schoolhouse where the accident occurred the schoolhouse being near a corner), which regulation the Court below refused to admit in evidence. Held, that since it was not shown that the plaintiff was aware of the regulation, and since the regulation was not relevant to the issue of the defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s contributory negligence as made by the evidence there was no error in this ruling.</p> <p>If a street car stops to let off passengers at a place not a customary stopping place, those in charge of the car must wait long enough to enable passengers alighting to do so in safety.</p> <p>When a passenger in a street car signals the conductor to stop and he does so, and the passenger begins to alight while the car is at a standstill and is injured by its starting before he gets wholly off, that is evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, although the car was not then at a crossing and a notice posted in the car stated that it would stop at crossings.</p> <p>Plaintiff was a female passenger with a companion on defendant’s street railway and notified the conductor that they wished to get off at the next crossing. The conductor pulled the bell and the car stopped about fifty feet from the crossing. While the plaintiff was in the act of stepping from the foot-board, the car started again and plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured. Defendant offered testimony to show that the car was not moving when plaintiff fell, but that, after putting one foot to the ground, she fell over backwards. This notice was posted in the car : ‘‘No one is permitted to ride on the platform or to get off or on when the car is in motion. Persons are warned of the danger. Cars stop to take on and let off passengers at near sides of cross streets. Those violating these orders do so at their own risk.” Held, that the uncontradicted evidence shows that when the car stopped the plaintiff was justified in assuming that passengers were expected to get off, and that the conductor knew that plaintiff was in the act of descending when the car started again and that therefore there was evidence of the defendant’s negligence and there was no such contributory negligence of the plaintiff as bars the action.</p> <p>Held, further that the trial Court properly refused to instruct the jury that if the notice warned passengers that the cars stopped for them to get off at cross streets and the plaintiff was injured while disregarding this warning, that is conclusive evidence of negligence on her part. Held, also, that the notice posted in the car does not mean that the cars would stop only at cross streets.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Frederick County (Motter, J.)</p> <p>The cause was submitted to the Court on briefs by:</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dorchester County, (Lloyd, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court oí Baltimore City (Phelps, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County (Williams, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas (Harlan, C. J.)</p>

<p>Release of One of Several foint Debtors— Who is Holder in Good Faith of Promissory Note—Note Obtained by Fraud and Negotiated Before Maturity to Bank—Instructions to fury—Insufficient Evidence to Show Bad Faith of Holder.</p> <p>A release, not under seal, of one of two or more joint debtors, all being principals, does not discharge the other debtors.</p> <p>The agent of the owner sold a worthless Spanish jackass and obtained from the purchasers a promissory note payable to the seller. The note was in fact obtained by means of fraudulent representations and there was a failure of consideration. The payee transferred the note before maturity and for a valuable consideration to the plaintiff bank. In an action thereon, the trial Court, at the instance of the plaintiff, instructed the jury that if they found that when the plaintiff acquired the note it had no notice of any fraud in its obtention, or of any failure of consideration therein, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and that there was no legally sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the plaintiff had any knowledge or noticé of fraud or want of consideration in the making of the note. At the instance of the defendants the Court also instructed the jury that if they found that the note was obtained from the defendants by fraud, then the burden is on the plaintiff to show that it became the holder of the note before it was overdue, in good faith, for value and without notice of anyinfirmily or defect in the title of the persons negotiating it to the plaintiff, and unless the jury believe from the evidence that said note was thus acquired by the plaintiff their verdict should be for the defendants. Held, that there is a direct conflict between these two instructions, because by the first the jury are told that there is no legal evidence of knowledge or notice of fraud, and yet by the second they are allowed to find that the note was not taken in good faith; that, as the case is now presented, plaintiff’s instruction was properly granted, and defendants’ instruction should have been refused.</p> <p>Held, further that if, upon the facts of the case, such an instruction as that of the defendants above mentioned could properly be granted, then it was error to reject an instruction asked by the plaintiff to the effect that if the plaintiff acquired the note without knowledge that it had been obtained by fraud, then the plaintiff is a bona fide holder, and merely suspicious circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry, or even gross negligence on the part of the plaintiff at the time it acquired the note, are not sufficient of themselves to prevent a recovery, unless the jury find from the evidence that in taking said note the plaintiff acted in bad faith.</p> <p>The note in this case, when taken by the plaintiff, bore the following endorsements : “Received of J. W. D. §33.33 on the within note, and he is hereby released from further payment on the same.” “Received of E. D. H. $33 33 on the within note.” Neither was signed. Held, that if these endorsements were the only suspicious circumstance or evidence to show knowledge of fraud by the plaintiff, then such circumstance or evidence was not legally sufficient to show bad faith or to prevent recovery by the plaintiff, and the jury should have been so instructed.</p> <p>One who takes a promissory note before maturity and for value, without notice or knowledge of defects in the title of the endorser or fraud in its inception, is a holder in good faith.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Harford County, (Watters, J.), where there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,000.</p>

<p>Pleading— Trespass de Bonis Asportaiis—Evidence— Goods Being Unlawfully Sold Cannot be Seized by Private Person—Advice of Counsel—Oleomargarine Forcibly Taken From Dealer—Punitive Damages—Joint Tort Feasors.</p> <p>When, after leave to amend has been granted, a new plea, bearing the same number as the original one, is filed, the latter will be considered as withdrawn.</p> <p>That a party acted in good faith, under the advice of counsel learned in the law, and without malice, is no defense to an action of trespass for unlawfully carrying away plaintiff’s goods.</p> <p>Since oleomargarine may under some conditions be lawfully possessed and sold, a declaration charging defendant with forcibly taking oleomargarine from the plaintiff is not defective because it does not nega-</p> <p>. tive the existence of such facts as would make its possession by the plaintiff unlawful.</p> <p>A declaratton charging the defendant with unlawfully entering plaintiff’s place of business and forcibly taking and carrying away a tub of oleomargarine to the injury of plaintiff’s business is not defective, inasmuch as trespass quare clausum fregit may be combined with trespass de bonis asportatis; and the allegation as to the injury to plaintiff’s business was only intended to enhance the damages</p> <p>In an action for unlawfully taking away oleomargarine from plaintiff’s possession, evidence that the police had been ordered to take certain action looking to the arrest of alleged violators of the oleomargarine law, and that the plaintiff had been previously convicted of violating said law, is not admissible.</p> <p>The fact that a party is engaged in the business of selling certain articles in violation of law does not authorize a private person to enter his shop and forcibly carry away such articles ; and in action to recover damages for such trespass he is entitled to punitive damages.</p> <p>The defendant M- was a member of a Butter Dealers Protective Association and was active in the prosecution of persons selling oleomargarine in violation of law. Another defendant, W., was employed by the association to procure evidence against dealers in oleomargarine. The defendant W. went to plaintiff’s shop and tried to buy a package of yellow oleomargarine, but the plaintiff refused to sell. W. then consulted with M. who told him that if plaintiff would not sell he was justifled in taking a package as evidence. W. then returned to plaintiff’s shop, seized a tub of oleomargarine and, against plaintiff’s protest, carried it away to M.’s place of business. In an action of trespass, Held,</p> <p>ist. That since the evidence shows that W. was acting under the instructions of M., the jury was properly instructed that the plaintiff was entitled to recover against both.</p> <p>2nd. That it was also proper to instruct the jury that they could award to plaintiff punitive damages if they found that the taking was done willfully, wantonly, against the protest of plaintiff and with full knowledge on the part of the defendants that the said goods were the property of the plaintiff.</p> <p>In the above case two other parties were also made defendants, and at the close of the evidence the defendants all asked the Court to instruct the jury that there was no legally sufficient evidence to warrant a finding'against them. The Court granted this instruction as to the two other defendants but refused it as to M. and W. Held, that upon an appeal from a judgment against them by M. and W. they cannot be heard to say that the instruction as granted was erroneous and that there was evidence against the discharged defendants although they had asked the Court to rule that there was none.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Wright, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Frederick County (Motter, J.) The prior order of that Court passed on July 16th, 1900, referred to in the opinion of this Court, was in pursuance of an opinion by McSherry, C. J., and Motter, J., in which it was held that although there is no statute giving to a Court of equity power to appoint a guardian under the conditions of this case yet, first, that the Maryland Courts of equity have succeeded to and now possess precisely the power which both, the Colonial and State Courts of Chancery had been clothed with to appoint a guardian for an infant under just such conditions as this record presents; and that the Colonial Court of Chancery under its constituent Act and the State Court of Chancery under the original law of 1776 each exercised and was authorized to exercise the same jurisdiction in this particular, that the English Court of Chancery, from a very early period, asserted without question and freely invoked. Secondly, that the grant to the old county Courts and subsequently to the Orphans’ Courts, of a like power conferred simply a concurrent jurisdiction which did not oust or take away, the established jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery or its successor, the Courts of equity.</p> <p>And that a Court of equity, exercising the functions of a Court of Chancery, has authority to appoint a guardian for an infant, when the infant is not a party to any cause pending in that Court.</p>

<p> Construction of an Agreement—Release of Claims. </p> <p>S. was entitled to a one-third interest in certain land, and being indebted to one B. he conveyed this interest to May, as trustee, to hold for the benefit of B. during B.’s life and then in trust for A. B. the son of S. Subsequently the indebtedness to B. was liquidated and May, trustee, conveyed the legal title to the land to A. B. Prior thereto an agreement was made between A. B. and his father, S. which recited that A. B. had certain claims against S. and May and had agreed to relinquish and discharge the same in consideration of the conveyance of certain property by S. to A. B. Held, that the agreement did not operate to divest the title of A. B. to the land held by May as trustee because having then an equitable fee in that land A. B. could have had no demands against S. in repect to it, and S. then had an interest in that land.</p>

<p> Warehouse Receipts For Goods Issued by a Company Not Carrying on a Warehouse Business. </p> <p>The Undine Milling Company was incorporated for the purpose of manufacturing flour, etc., and for the purchase, sale and storage of grain. The company did not have a storage warehouse other than the elevator connected with the mill. All the wheat in the elevator was intended to be made into flour and none of it was ever delivered to the parties leaving it there or to third persons. Sometimes the wheat brought to the elevator was priced up immediately and sometimes that was done at a future time—the latter being called “stored” wheat, but this was mingled with the other wheat and subsequently manufactured. The Milling Co. borrowed money from a bank and gave as collateral security receipts stating that the company had received in store from the bank a certain number of bushels of wheat, subject to the order of the bank and to be delivered upon the surrender of the receipts. Upon the failure of the Milling Co., the bank contended that it was entitled to priority over the creditors because these receipts were warehouse receipts within the purview of Code, Art. 14, sec. 1, which provides that all warehouse, elevator or storage receipts for goods stored, &c., shall be negotiable instruments, &c., and full and complete title to the property in the instruments mentioned shall enure to, and be vested in, each and every bona fide holder thereof for value. Held, that the Milling Co. was not a warehouseman within the meaning of this statute so as to make valid, as against other creditors, these receipts issued by it on its own wheat and as security for its own debts.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree ot the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Merrick, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from Baltimore City Court (Dennis, J.)</p>

) The trial Court gave the following instruction to the jury in lieu of plaintiff’s first and second prayers : If the jury find that on the 18th day of July, 1901, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant a round trip non-transferable ticket from Baltimore to Pen Mar and return, and that said ticket provided that she should, on the outgoing trip surrender said ticket to the conductor and receive from him in lieu thereof a special ticket for the return trip and further…

<p>Trusts— Voluntary Settlement Held Not to be Revocable.</p> <p>When a party with full knowledge of the circumstances makes a voluntary settlement of property in trust for the benefit of himself for life with remainder to his heirs at law, the mere fact that the declaration of trust contains no power of revocation or of testamentary disposition does not impeach the validity of the settlement.</p> <p>A testator gave the residue of his estate to a Trust Company with directions to pay the income thereof to his wife during her life and to divide the property after her death among their children. By a subsequent clause of the will he requested his wife to collect the amounts due under policies of insurance on his life, payable to her, and to put the same in the possession of the Trust Company to be held by it upon the same trusts as those set forth regarding the residue of his estate. After the testator’s death his widow collected the amounts of the policies and paid the same to the Trust Company and at the same time executed a declaration of trust setting forth that the money should be invested and held by the company for the purposes mentioned in the will. Fourteen years afterwards she filed the bill in this case alleging that she had paid the money to the company and executed the declaration of trust in ignorance of the fact that she was the real owner of the money collected on the policies and not knowing then that she was at liberty to disregard the request contained in the will, and that the declaration of trust was not her free and voluntary act. The bill prayed that the declaration of trust be cancelled and the fund held thereunder be assigned to the plaintiff as her individual property. Held, that since the evidence shows that the plaintiff was fully competent at the time she executed the deed of trust and knew that the policies of insurance were her own property and there was then no fiduciary relation between her and the company, and her purpose in making the settlement was to comply with her husband’s request and guard against her own improvidence, she is not now entitled to have the trust terminated and the funds held under it paid over to her.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Dobler, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Dobler, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Sharp, J.)</p>

<p>Negligence—Master and Servant—Breaking of Cross-arm on Telephone Pole Injuring Employee Seated Thereon— Withdrawing Case From Jury.</p> <p>While plaintiff was sitting on a cross-arm fastened to a telephone pole of the defendant company and occupied in tightening the wire previously strung on the pole, the cross-arm broke, throwing plaintiff to the ground and causing the injury for which this action was brought. The cross-arm was about 10 ft. long, 4 inches thick, and had 10 holes bored in it a foot apart and 1 yí inches in diameter in which were inserted the pins supporting the insulators. After the accident it was discovered that the cross-arm broke because one of the holes had been bored near a knot in the wood. This defect was not visible upon inspection, the knot being obscured by paint. The plaintiff’s evidence showed that the defendant company purchased its cross-arms already painted and with the holes bored in them by machinery; that the cross-arm which broke was similar to those used by other telephone companies for the same purpose; that it was very unusual for a cross-arm to break except in consequence of a storm, and that the arms supplied to them were open to the inspection of defendants employees. There was no evidence that any test which could have been employed would have disclosed the defect which caused this particular arm to break. Held, that since there is no evidence of any negligence on the part of the de- . fendant in the purchase or use of this cross-arm, or in failing to discover the hidden defect, and since the plaintiff assumed the risks incident to his employment against which defendant’s reasonable care could not protect him, the jury should have been instructed that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.</p> <p>Held, further, that since the plaintiff’s own witnesses explained the nature and cause of the accident, it was not necessary for the defendant to offer any testimony before asking the Court to withdraw the case from the jury.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court (Dennis, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Burke, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Phelps, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Harlan, C. J.)</p>

<p> Validity of Statute Providing that Personal Properly Held in Trust Shall be Taxed at the Place of Residence of the Beneficial Owner—-Constitutional Law. </p> <p>The Act of 1902, ch. 486, provides that all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, etc., and all personal property in which any resident of a county of this State has an equitable interest, with the legal title to the same in some other person or corporation who is a resident of some other county or of the city of Baltimore shall be valued and assessed for the purpose of taxation to the equitable owner in the county in which he resides, and the taxes due thereon shall be paid to the collector of taxes for the county or city in which said property is so valued and assessed. Held, that when property is held in trust there are two persons each of whom is in a certain sense the owner, viz., the trustee who holds the legal title and the cestui que trust who is the beneficial and substantial owner, and that the Legislature has the power to prescribe that for the purposes of taxation property held in trust shall be treated as belonging to its substantial owner and not to its technical owner; and further that the Act of 1902, ch. 406, is not in conflict with Article 15 of the Bill of Rights, which declares that every person ‘‘ holding property ” in this State ought to contribute his proportion of taxes, nor is it in conflict with Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 51, which provides that personal property of residents in this State shall be subject to taxation where the resident bona fide resides for the greater part of the year.</p> <p>Held, further, that when the personal property held in trust consists of shares of stock in corporations of this State, the Act of 1902, ch. 406, being in pari materia with the existing laws requiring the corporation to pay the taxes on its stock for the stockholder, the two laws should be construed together, and the residence of the cestui que trust be treated as the situs for taxation, and the’ taxes be paid by the corporation in accordance with the system in force for the payment of such taxes.</p> <p>Held, further, that the Act of 1902, ch. 406, is not construed to be effectual in so far as it may conflict with Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 51, which directs that goods and chattels permanently located shall be taxed in the city or county where they are so located.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Phelps, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Sharp, J.), sustaining a demurrer to the bill of complaint and dismissing the same.</p>

<p> Bill to Vacate a Decree for Fraud in Its Obtention—Insufficient Allegations of Fraud. </p> <p>A decree of a Court will not afterwards be annulled upon an original bill alleging fraud in obtaining it unless the fraud be extrinsic to the matters tried in the former case; and the decree will not be vacated for reasons which were presented to, and considered by, the Court in the former case.</p> <p>The fraud relied on to set aside a decree must be actual and positive, and the particular acts of fraud must be distinctly alleged. A bill making vague and general allegations of fraud is demurrable.</p> <p>A decree was made ratifying a sale- of the partnership property of a lunatic to his partner, who was also his brother, under a bill alleging that a sale of his property would be for the benefit of the lunatic. The allegations of the bill were proved and the valuations of the lunatic’s property were made by competent and respectable witnesses. The decree was passed after a report by an auditor and master of the Court that he had found the valuation of the partnership property to be fair and that it would be for the advantage of the lunatic to ratify the sale. Seven years afterwards the lunatic, having been restored to reason and his committee discharged, filed the bill in this case to set aside the decree of sale for fraud, alleging an unfair valuation of the partnership property and that the proceedings had been conducted to the injury of the plaintiff on account of the influence which his brother and partner had over his committee who was another brother. The proceedings in the former case were made a part of this. Held, that the bill fails to state such a case of fraud in obtaining the former decree as would justify the Court in vacating it.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Sharp, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Harford County (Watters, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Phelps, J).</p>

) The contract on which this action was brought was as follows: “ In consideration of the Com. and Farmers Nat. Bank of Baltimore discounting from time to time the promissory notes or other evidence of debt of the United Milk Producers Assn, of Balto.

<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>The cause was argued at the January Term and was re-argued at the April Term, 1903, before McSherry, C. J., Briscoe, Page, Boyd, Pearce and Schmucker, JJ.</p>

2, of Baltimore City (Dobler, J.); dismissing the bill of complaint “without prejudice to the plaintiff to file a new bill with the proper parties.” One of the notes referred to in the opinion of the Court was as follows : $33. Baltimore, Md., Jan’y 13, 1902. Thirty days after date promise to pay to the order of James A. Galloway, thirty-three dollars and- cents at value re- ceived, with interest from date.

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Wickes, J.)</p>

<p> Time of Filing Certificate of Nomination of Municipal Officers for Election in the City op Annapolis—Jurisdiction to Issue Injunction. </p>

<p> Act of Assembly Relating to Elections in the City of Annapolis Invalid Because Subject Matter not Described in the Title. </p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Dobler, J.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City (Dobler, J.)</p>

<p> Failure to Furnish Briefs When Case is Reached on Appeal. </p>