¶1dissenting.
¶2I agree that there is no merit in appellant’s second complaint. I also agree that Md.Rule 1-502 creates a three-part test for determining whether a prior conviction is admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment. I dissent, however, from the holding that a conviction for distribution of cocaine may never be used for impeachment.
¶3It is of no consequence that the trial judge might have been confused about how to decide whether appellant’s prior conviction was relevant to credibility. Our task is to determine whether that decision was correct. Joiner v. State, 82 Md.App. 282, 293, 571 A.2d 844 (1990). I do not agree, however, that the trial judge appeared to be confused. When defense counsel argued that appellant’s conviction was inadmissible under a different rule, it was the trial judge who announced that Rule 1-502 must be applied. As required by that rule, the trial judge first considered whether a conviction for distribution of cocaine is relevant to a witness’s credibility.
¶4The trial judge stated that distribution of cocaine is (1) a crime of morale turpitude; and (2) a felony. Those statements do not indicate confusion. It is reasonable to characterize distribution of cocaine as a crime of moral turpitude. See Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 320-321, 191 A. 240 (1937), and Attorney Griev. Comm’n. v. Walman, 280 Md. 453, 459-60, 374 A.2d 354 (1977). Distribution of cocaine is a felony. The maximum penalty for a first conviction of this offense is twenty (20) years and a fine of $25,000.00. Md.Ann. Code art. 27, § 286(b)(1).
¶5A prior conviction is relevant if it has any tendency to establish that the witness lacks veracity. That determination involves a question of law. The judge was either right or wrong. In my opinion, he was right. A conviction for distribution of cocaine is relevant to a person’s credibility.
¶6*595Having correctly determined as a matter of law that distribution of cocaine is a crime which is “relevant to the witness’s credibility,” the trial judge proceeded to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, the probative value of that conviction outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to appellant. This case by case determination requires an exercise of discretion. The trial judge stated that he would have excluded the conviction if appellant were on trial for “a charge of distribution” of controlled dangerous substances. Appellant, however, was the defendant in a “one on one” assault case. The trial judge therefore ruled that he would (1) allow the prosecutor to question appellant about the distribution conviction, and (2) deliver a limiting instruction. I am not persuaded that these rulings constitute an abuse of discretion.
¶7A trial judge is not bound by the formal rules of evidence when trying to figure out whether a particular item of evidence should be admitted or excluded. When urging the trial judge to prohibit the State from using the conviction to impeach appellant, defense counsel had the opportunity to, but did not, discuss the circumstances of that conviction. Appellant had superior knowledge of whatever unique or mitigating circumstances were involved in the prior conviction. If appellant’s distribution conviction involved nothing more than handing a mirror with cocaine residue to a fellow attendee of a rock concert, this information should have been given to the trial judge.
¶8Having made no attempt to supply the trial judge with any facts which would indicate that, in this particular case, the probative value of appellant’s prior conviction did not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice to him, appellant now suggests that the prior conviction might not have involved surreptitious conduct. We should not speculate that appellant “may have committed a very minor infraction indicative of nothing more than momentary poor judgment” or that his conviction did not involve proof of secretive conduct.
¶9*596We do indeed see many drug cases, but of the cocaine distribution cases which come before the trial and appellate courts of this state, rare are the ones that do not involve surreptitious behavior. That 'appellant was sentenced “to prison” indicates that he was guilty of a serious violation of the controlled dangerous substances laws. There is simply no warrant to declare all cocaine distribution convictions ineligible for impeachment because a minuscule number of them may not entail secretive behavior.
¶10In fairness to the witness who is impeached with proof of a conviction, the party who uses this mode of impeachment is prohibited from asking about the circumstances of the conviction. State v. Watson, 321 Md. 47, 55, 580 A.2d 1067 (1990). That prohibition, however, does not prohibit the witness from testifying about any mitigating circumstances which the fact-finder ought to consider in deciding how much impact the conviction has on the witness’s credibility. During his testimony, appellant could have explained the circumstances of the conviction, “if in extenuation of the act and in mitigation of its effect.” Donnelly v. Donnelly, 156 Md. 81, 86, 143 A. 648 (1928). No extenuating circumstances were mentioned.
¶11Appellant also had an opportunity to further blunt the effect of the impeachment by showing that the court imposed an inconsequential punishment. Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 469-471, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985). Appellant did not tell the jury the exact length of his prison sentence. Appellant’s strategic decision to forego these opportunities provides additional support for the proposition that the trial judge was correct when ruling that the State could cross examine appellant about his prior conviction for distribution of cocaine. I would affirm.