¶1 (after stating the facts). The sole question presented by the record in this case for our decision is, did the deed in question operate to convey the fee simple estate in the land therein described as situate and being on the north side of the road mentioned to Annabella Munroe and Mary Munroe?
¶2 We cannot hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative. The deed by appropriate terms for that purpose, conveys the fee to them, and there is nothing in it that at all indicates a contrary intention on the part of the donor, except the words limiting the estate to these sisters “ as long as either of them is single,” and the proviso in a subsequent part of it, that they should never “ sell or dispose of any part of the above named land … in any manner whatever.”
¶3 The effect of the words “ as long as either of them is single,” need not be considered, because both the sisters died many years ago, and were never married. In any possible view of these words, they could only indicate a purpose to give *210 the land to Patrick in a contingency that never happened and never can happen. There is no intimation of any purpose to abridge the estate given them, unless in the contingency of marriage.
¶4 As to the proviso recited above, it is repugnant to the fee simple estate previously conveyed, and is in absolute restraint of all alienation, and is therefore simply void. An important incident of the fee simple estate, is the right of alienation, and hence, any condition in a deed conveying lands or a devise that seeks to prevent alienation altogether, is void, being repugnant to the estate conveyed. The rule, however, is not so comprehensive in its operation 'as to prevent all conditions and restraints upon the power of alienation. Such as are limited and reasonable in their application, and .as to the time they must operate, are valid and will be upheld. 1 Wash, on R. P., 67-69; 4 Kent.Com., 135; Pearson’s Law Lee., 135.
¶5 There is no error and the judgment must be affirmed.
¶6 No error. Affirmed.