¶1 (after stating the facts). The application is not merely for rents accruing since the rendering upon its *259 merits, but to change the judgment itself, and open up the general inquiry as to rents, including those with which the defendant is chargeable before. The appropriate time to institute the inquiry was after verdict and before judgment. The orderly and usual mode of proceeding, is to have all the facts ascertained, and before the Court where the action is to be disposed of, and the rights of the parties settled by the final adjudication. This was not done, but the rights of the contestants declared, the plaintiff being entitled to a conveyance of the legal estate on payment of the sum due the defendant and subject to the contingent claim of dower. The payment to the defendant must precede the transfer of title, and now it is proposed to extinguish the debt by proof of the reception of "rents sufficient to discharge it.
¶2 We concur with the Court, that the judgment ought not, if the power was possessed to do so, to be disturbed after so long an interval, and after its affirmation in the appellate Court.
¶3 It is manifestly too late after such action, to re-open the controversy by introducing a new element of strife, after a final adjudication.
¶4 In Pearson v. Carr, at this Term, we have so ruled.
¶5 This does not deprive the plaintiff of seeking compensation for rents accruing since the judgment, inasmuch as they were not recoverable in this action, and are not concluded in its rendition.
¶6 In our examination of the voluminous transcript sent up, much of it wholly needless, in order to a full understanding of the matter of appeal, we may have overlooked some part in the case, but the summary rehearsal of the proceedings we have given, is enough to explain the grounds upon which the ruling below is sustained. There is no error, and the judgment is affirmed.
¶7 No error. Affirmed.