OpenJurist › Volume 97 › S.C. › Page 171 97 S.C. 171
Davis v. Littlefield Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1914-04-21
Before Gage;, J., Action by Alonzo1 Davis against A. S. Littlefield and R. S. Littlefield. From a judgment for the plaintiff against A. S. Littlefield, he appeals. The case was stated in appellant’s brief, as follows: “Mr. A. S. Littlefield, the defendant-appellant herein, who' is a resident of Chicago1, rented a house in Aiken for the winter season of 1911-1913, and established his family there.
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Affirmed · Decided 1914-04-21
How this case has been cited Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently January 1992 · most notably Hays v. Hogan (1917), Arkin v. Page (1919)
1 federal appellate · 1 district · 25 state decisions — followed in 17 states
11 0 1914 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 decided Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
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Mr. Justice Hydrick,
¶1
dissenting.
I dissent from the conclusion that appellant is liable, and concur in the disposition o f the other grounds of appeal.
Mr. Justice Gage did not sit in this case.
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Status
Disposition: Affirmed
Case posture Disposition Affirmed. Posture Before GAGE, J., Aiken, November, 1913. Affirmed.Action by Alonzo Davis against A.S. Littlefield and R.S. Littlefield. From a judgment for the plaintiff against A.S. Littlefield, he appeals.
The case was stated in appellant's brief, as follows:
Mr. A.S. Littlefield, the defendant-appellant herein, who is a resident of Chicago, rented a house in Aiken for the winter season of 1911-1912, and established his family there. Mr. Littlefield was, much of the time, in Chicago, where he was engaged in business. Mrs. Littlefield, who
was in ill health, was in Aiken during the entire winter. Mr. Randolph S. Littlefield, a son, then of the age of nineteen, was also in Aiken, and during the Christmas holidays two other sons spent their time there. Mr. Littlefield provided a Pearce Arrow automobile, as he testified, `for the health and pleasure' of his family. Mr. Randolph Littlefield ran this car most of the time. When the other sons were in Aiken during the Christmas holidays they ran the car when they pleased. Mr. Randolph Littlefield registered the car in the office of the clerk of the Court of Aiken county, in the name of his father, A.S. Littlefield, who was the owner thereof. Randolph Littlefield had the permission of the father to use the machine for his pleasure when he saw fit; and whenever it was the desire of Mrs. Littlefield to use the machine, either Randolph Littlefield or the other sons, when they were in Aiken, would run the car for her.
On the 13th day of February, 1912, while A.S. Littlefield, the father, was in Chicago, Randolph Littlefield, having some friends stopping at the tourist hotel in Aiken, the Park-in-the-Pines, took the car out and started to the Park-in-the-Pines to get these friends to take them to ride; no one accompanied him. His mother was at home, and it was not her intention to take part in this trip in any manner.
While Randolph Littlefield was going to the Park-in-the-Pines to get these friends, whom he intended to take to ride, for his own personal pleasure and theirs, he encountered the plaintiff, Alonzo Davis, who was driving a pair of mules. The mules became frightened. Exactly what occurred between Davis and Randolph Littlefield is in dispute. As a result of the occurrence, the team ran away, and Davis was thrown out and alleges that he was injured. He brought suit against A.S. Littlefield and Randolph S. Littlefield, jointly, alleging, in effect, that Randolph Littlefield occupied the position of servant to his father in running the
machine, and that both father and son were responsible for his injury.
The case was tried before Judge Gage and a jury, in November, 1913, and the jury rendered a verdict against A.S. Littlefield alone for the sum of four hundred and seventy-five dollars. After the verdict a motion for a new trial was made, both on the ground that the verdict against A.S. Littlefield was unsustainable under the facts and the law of the case, and on the ground of misconduct on the part of one of the jurors. The facts in connection with the latter ground will hereafter be stated. The motion was refused and judgment entered up, from which this appeal is taken.
Before discussing what we conceive to be the law of this case, there are two questions which we desire to bring to the Court's attention by way of elimination.
The alleged accident, upon which this suit is based, occurred on February 13, 1912. The legislature, on February 16, 1912, passed an act (which became law some days later, and a considerable time after the date of the accident in question) by which a party injured in this State, in an automobile accident, was given the right to attach the car which caused the injury. We desire particularly to call the Court's attention to the fact that this act does not purport, in any manner, to create a new liability or to change the existing rules of law, which we shall, hereafter, contend govern this case, but merely provides a new right of attachment in addition to the existing rights under the attachment statutes.
Should it in any manner be contended that this statute creates or purports to create, a new liability, the facts of its passage after the date of the accident in question would dispose of this new statute as affecting the present case. We might also add that if the statute had been in existence on the 13th day of February, 1912, and should a contention be made that it purports to create a new liability, and to make the owner of the car responsible for the act of a third party,
who did not bear to the owner or relationship of servant, and from whose act the owner could not be held responsible under the existing rules of law — we would, then, submit that such a statute would be unconstitutional as arbitrarily taking property without due process of law, and as being unwarranted class legislation.
II. Another consideration that should be eliminated to the possible contention that A.S. Littlefield is liable because he placed within the reach of his minor son an alleged dangerous instrumentality, to wit, an automobile. The proof in the case showed that the minor son, Randolph, was an expert in the running of automobiles; but this entire matter may be eliminated from the case for the very simple reason that no allegation to fit such contention appears in the complaint, and such an idea was in no manner made the test of A.S. Littlefield's responsibility by the presiding Judge in his charge.
After the trial had closed and the jury was considering its verdict, it came to the attention of one of counsel that one of the jurors had accepted of the hospitality and had spent the night in the house of a Mr. Weeks, who is personally prosecuting an action against Mr. A.S. Littlefield for injury to his team, which was being driven by Alonzo Davis at the time of the alleged accident, and which, the said Mr. Weeks claims, was injured in said accident. After the jury had rendered its verdict this report was confirmed, and was made the basis of a motion for a new trial. Affidavits were presented pro and con; the Court examined the juror in open Court, and then filed an order refusing the motion, which is printed in the brief and fully states the facts. The Court criticised the action of both Mr. Weeks and the juror, but on the ground that both of them swore that the case was not discussed, and in the exercise of its discretion, refused the motion.
Upon the authority of McGill v. Ry. , 75 S.C. 177 , 55 S.E. 216 , we submit that the motion should have been granted, and that its refusal constituted abuse of discretion.
The case above cited holds that the accepting of the hospitality of a law agent by a member of the trial jury constituted a ground upon which the verdict should be set aside, and that to fail to do so amounts to abuse of discretion. The reasoning of the Court is the basis of the motion in the present case; that the stream of justice should remain unpolluted; that the administration of the law should be pure and above any possibility of taint or criticism, and that the Courts should not only be pure, but should be above any suspicion of impurity.
We submit that the facts adduced here are on all fours with the facts of the Lexington case. It is true that there was no proof that the case was discussed between Mr. Weeks and the juror — that could not be proven in the nature of things, and was not proven in the Lexington case — but we submit that with the question not brought closely before the Court that it will not be safe for the Court to establish the proposition that a juror, although he claims not to discuss the case is, in the future in South Carolina, at liberty, during the trial of a case, to accept the hospitality and to spend the night at the home of a party who is pecuniarily interested in the outcome of the litigation. Source: CourtListener
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