97 So. 3d 800 - Thompson v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2011
Citation profile
12
cited by 12 later decisions
1
states following
April 2016
most recently cited
11 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Edwards v. Arizona · Davis v. United States · Fare v. Michael C. · Smith v. Illinois
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““ ‘ “The weight of the evidence is clearly a different matter from the sufficiency of the evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence concerns the question of whether, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [a] rational fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ “ ‘ “In contrast, ‘the “weight of the evidence” refers to a “determination [by] the trier of fact that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.” ’ We have repeatedly held that it is not the province of this [C]ourt to reweigh the evidence presented at trial. ‘ “The credibility of witnesses and the weight or probative force of testimony is for the jury to judge and determine.” ’ ” ’ “Seaton v. State, 645 So.2d 341, 342-43 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), quoting Johnson v. State, 555 So.2d 818, 819-20 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) (citations omitted). “ ‘Once a prima facie case has been submitted to the jury, this Court will not upset the jury’s verdict except in extreme situations in which it is clear from the record that the evidence against the accused was so lacking as to make the verdict wrong and unjust. Deutcsh v. State, 610 So.2d 1212, 1234-35 (Ala.Cr.App.1992). This Court will not substitute itself for the jury in determining the weight and probative force of the evidence. Benton v. State, 536 So.2d 162, 165 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).’ “May v. State, 710 So.2d 1362, 1372 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). “ ‘Furthermore, on appeal, there i”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Rudolph v. State · Chapman v. State““ ‘ “This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence when the facts are not in dispute. See State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala.1996); State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d 950, 952 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999).” ’ State v. C.B.D., 71 So.3d 717, 718 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting State v. Skaggs, 903 So.2d 180, 181 (Ala.Crim. App.2004)). “ As our Supreme Court has stated: ‘““The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ‘[n]o person ,.. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ U.S. Const. Amend. V. In Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], the United States Supreme Court held that the right against self-incrimination ‘is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.’ 384 U.S. at 460 . The Supreme Court in Miranda further held that ‘the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege....’ 384 U.S. at 469 . Before a custodial interrogation, a suspect must be informed of these rights, now commonly referred to as Miranda rights. 384 U.S. at 444 (‘Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.’). The Supreme Court in Miranda recognized that ‘the defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided that the waiver is”
3 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Woolf v. State · Ward v. State““During a custodial interrogation, if the suspect unequivocally requests counsel at any time before or after the suspect waives his Miranda rights, ‘the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’ Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. If the suspect makes an equivocal reference to an attorney after waiving his Miranda rights, the interrogating officer has no obligation to stop questioning the suspect and the officer is not required to ask questions to clarify whether the suspect actually wants an attorney. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459-62 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). However, if a suspect makes an equivocal reference to an attorney before waiving his Miranda rights, the interrogating officer is required to ask questions to clarify the reference until the suspect either clearly invokes his right to counsel or waives it. See State v. Collins, 937 So.2d 86, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that ‘[bjecause [the defendant] did not waive her Miranda rights before she asked the questions about obtaining a lawyer, the ambiguity of her questions required the interrogating officer to ask follow-up questions to clarify the ambiguity’). [[Image here]] “In determining whether a suspect’s statement was an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel, we are guided by the following principles: “ ‘ “The applicability of the ‘ “rigid” prophylactic rule’ of Edwards[ v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981) ] requires courts to ‘determine whether the accused a”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Lockhart v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.