97 So. 3d 994 - State v. Trahan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Jurors were therefore entitled at the close of the evidence to hold the defense accountable for its failure to introduce any evidence in support of the hypothesis of innocence proposed by defense counsel, apart from the coroner’s vague statement in response to questioning by the defense that he understood some sort of altercation had occurred earlier on the day of the shooting, a detail far more helpful to the state than the defense because it provided the only evidence of motive in the case. Jurors were also entitled to consider the direct evidence defendant provided in her admission to the 9-1-1 operator that she had shot the victim and to the first responders that the victim’s body and the gun were still inside the house, the source for defense counsel’s own judicial admission in his opening and closing remarks that defendant had killed the victim with the gun found by the police in the residence. See Martinez v. Bally’s Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir.2001) (“Although a judicial admission is not itself evidence, it has the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.”); United States v. Blood, 806 F.2d 1218, 1221 (4th Cir.1986) (“Generally, statements by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be admissible against the retaining client. Further, a clear and unambiguous admission of fact made by a party’s attorney in an opening statement in a civil or criminal case is binding upon the party.”); United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30 (2nd Ci”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 101 So. 3d 1083 - State v. Jones · 251 So. 3d 406 - State v. Trahan

2. “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon "jury" discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State of Louisiana v. Quint Mire

3. “A rational trier of fact could find from this evidence that defendant discharged the high-powered hand gun by pulling the trigger while holding the gun no more than three or four feet from the victim as he stood defenseless and bent over the washbasin in the bathroom with his back turned towards her, and from that evidence, that defendant had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, although she may then have become emotionally overwrought by what had just happened. Other scenarios involving an accidental discharge of the revolver, but not involving the failed hypothesis of innocence proposed by defense counsel and rejected by jurors, were possible but not so probable that a rational juror would necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State of Louisiana v. Quint Mire