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97 Tenn. 316

Bradshaw v. VanValkenburg

Tennessee Supreme Court

Decided September 28, 1896

Tennessee Supreme Court · decided 1896-09-28

<p>1. Bills and Notes. Bona fide holder of usurious note protected.</p> <p>A bona fide purchaser, without notice, of a negotiable promissory-note, is not affected by usury between the original parties. {Post, pp. 317-320.)</p> <p>Acts construed: Acts 1819, Ch. 32.</p> <p>Cases cited and approved: Ramsey v. Clark, 4 Hum., 246; Dews v. Eastham, 2 Yer., 462; Telford v. Sumner, 2 Yer., 255; May v. Campbell, 7 Hum., 450; Doak v. Snapp, 1 Cold., 183; Frazier v. Sypert, 2 Heis., 342; 29 L. R. A., 827.</p> <p>Cited and distinguished: Tait v. Hannum, 2 Yer., 350.</p> <p>2. Husband and Wife. Wife's power to disaffirm deed on account of infancy.</p> <p>A wife may disaffirm her deed executed when she was both a feme covert and a minor. (Post, pp. 320-322.)</p> <p>Case cited and approved: Walton u Gaines, 94 Tenn., 422.</p> <p>3. Pleadings. Essential.</p> <p>It is a fundamental principle of law that pi-oof without allegations will not sustain a decree. (Post, p. 322.)</p> <p>Cases cited and approved: Furman v. North, 4 Bax., 298; Rogers v. Breen, 9 Heis., 679; Bank v. Ins. Co., 85 Tenn., 87.</p> <p>4. Subbogation. Right of, does not exist, when.</p> <p>The beneficiary under a deed of trust will not be subrogated to the rights of the mortg-agee under a prior mortgage on the land, which was discharged with the proceeds of the loan secured by the deed of trust, as against the right of the wife of the grantor in the deed, who executed it with him, to disaffirm the same and recover her homestead because she was a minor when she executed and acknowledged the deed, where there was no agreement that the proceeds should be so applied, even if the mortgage discharg-ed was a purchase-money mortgage. (Post, pp. 321-323, 324, 32S.)</p> <p>Gases cited and approved: Owens». Johnson, 8 Bax., 265; Durant v. Davis, 10 Heis., 522; Bogan v. Simpson, 10 Heis., 655; Gray v. Baird, 4 Lea, 212; Loftis u Loftis,'94 Tenn., 244: Smith v. Neilson, 13 Lea, 461; Belcher v. Wickérsham. 9 Bax., 111.</p> <p>Cited and distinguished: Guinn v. Spurgin, 1 Lea, 228; Bentley v. Jordan, 3 Lea, 353; Byrns v. Woodward, 10 Lea, 444; Mul herrin v. Hill, 5 Heis., 58.</p> <p>5. Majreied Woman. Disaffirmance of coninxict.</p> <p>A married woman who disaffirms her voidable contract and recovers back her property, will not be required to restore money paid or advanced thereon, not to herself personally, but to her husband or upon his debts, although she may be thereby indirectly benefited. (Post, %>. 323.)</p> <p>Cases cited and approved: Smith v. Evans, 5 Hum., 69; Pilcher v. Smith, 2 Head, 206; Aiken v. Suttle, 4 Lea, 103.</p> <p>6. Supreme Court. Takes facts as found by Court of Chancery Appeals.</p> <p>This Court takes the facts as found by the Court of Chancery Appeals, and will not g-o behind the finding- of that Court in search of additional facts. (Post, p. 324.)</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1896-09-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently February 1966

6 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR.

Wilkes, J.

¶2A petition to rehear has been filed in this cause, in which it is insisted that a fact is disclosed by the record which has not been passed upon by the Court of Chancery Appeals, and which would change the holding of this Court.

¶3This Court takes the facts as they are found by the Court of Chancery Appeals, and will not seek to go behind that finding to search for other facts which counsel may deem important. If there were nothing else in the petition, therefore, it must be dismissed, as the Court of Chancery Appeals was not requested to find the additional facts now deemed important.

¶4The additional fact which is it alleged exists in the case, is that the original debt, secured by the first deed of trust given prior to the marriage of complainant, Bradshaw, was a debt contracted for the purchase money of the lot in controversy, and it is insisted that, under the provisions of the Code, § 2935 (M. & V.), and the decisions of this Court, when money has been borrowed to be applied to the payment of the purchase price of land, the debt so con*325tracted is entitled to priority over the homestead right. Citing Guinn v. Spurgin, 1 Lea, 228; Bentley v. Jordan, 3 Lea, 353; Byrns v. Woodward, 10 Lea, 444; Mulherrin v. Hill, 5 Heis., 58.

¶5Now, if petitioner is correct in his view of the law, it is evident that Wakeman, the holder of the debt in this case, could only be let into the rights of the original creditor upon the idea of subrogation or substitution, which, we have already held, is not raised by. the pleadings in the case, and cannot therefore be considered.

¶6But petitioner is mistaken in the law, even if the facts be as he claims. The case most nearly in point supporting his contention is the case of Guinn v. Spurgin, 1 Lea, 228. This case has been expressly overruled in the ease of Loftis v. Loftis, 10 Pickle, 244, and the other cases cited by petitioner are there commented upon and shown not to be in conflict with the principle there announced that a party who pays off purchase money is not thereby substituted or subrogated to the priority or liens in favor of the original creditor, and if he secure himself by mortgage his rights will depend on the mortgage and not on the original transaction. Loftis v. Loftis, 10 Pickle, 243.

¶7The petition to rehear is dismissed.

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