Volume 97 — Washington Reports

<p>Logs and Logging—Liens—Waiver—Sale and Appropriation op Purchase Money. Laborer’s liens on logs are not waived by an agreement allowing a purchaser to advance freight and booming expenses and saw the logs prior to execution sale, where no one was prejudiced, in view of Rem. Code, § 1177, making it the duty of the purchaser of liened logs to apply the purchase money to the satisfaction of bona fide liens; and this applies to liens for which no suit to foreclose had been instituted.</p> <p>Garnishment—Property Subject. Where logs had not come into the possession of a garnishee at the time the writ was served and answered, he would not be liable therefor under the writ.</p> <p>Logs and Logging — Laborers’ Liens — Priority Over Garnishment. Where laborers had prior liens upon saw logs, which were sold and sawed up and produced a fund which it was the duty of the purchaser to apply in satisfaction of the liens, a garnishment of the purchaser is ineffectual, even though the logs were in the purchaser’s possession at the time the writ was served and answered; Rem. Code, § 1206, giving priority to the laborers’ liens.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Blake J., entered August 21, 1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action on contract.</p>

, entered April 21, 1916, decreeing a deficiency judgment as against a defendant assignee of the mortgagor, in an action to foreclose a mortgage.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered October 19, 1915, upon findings in favor, of the defendants, in an action for specific performance, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Vendor and Purchaser—Rescission by Vendee—Misrepresentations. Falsely representing that there was no snapdragon on a farm is ground for rescission, where it appears that it is a noxious weed practically impossible to eradicate and that there were several large patches of it, materially reducing the value of the farm.</p> <p>Same—Misrepresentations — Evidence — Sufficiency. The evidence sufficiently establishes false representations by the vendor that there was no snapdragon on a farm, where it appears that he knew the weed, shocked oats over the patches of snapdragon on the farm, and stated that there was none to his knowledge, and the vendees testified that they made inquiry of the vendor, who represented there was none on the place.</p>

<p>Waters and Water Courses — Appropriation — Nonnavigable Streams—State Lands. Waters of a nonnavigable stream upon state lands granted for a scientific school cannot be appropriated by a nonriparian owner; since they are considered as part of the soil and as an incident to the owner’s estate, and since, by Const., art. 16, §§ 1 and 2, public lands granted to the state for educational purposes are held in trust for all the people and can be disposed of only by sale at public auction to the highest bidder.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Dykeman, J., entered September 25, 1915, in favor of the defendants, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.</p>

, entered September 11, 1915, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action for rescission, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Walla Walla county, Mills, J., entered April 18, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a passenger on a street car.</p>

, entered October 6, 1915, upon sustaining a demurrer to the petition, dismissing an application to modify a decree of divorce respecting alimony.

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered July 24, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendants, rej ecting a claim in receivership proceedings for franchise rentals due a city from a street railway corporation.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county, Sullivan, J., entered February 19, 1916, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action for breach of warranty.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered July 28, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for an accounting, tried to the court.</p>

, entered August 28, 1916, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial upon an agreed statement of facts, in an action on contract.

<p>Municipal Corporations—Improvements — Assessments •—■ Benefits—Evidence—Sufficiency. An assessment for benefits from the condemnation of an alley is not shown to have been excessive, or upon a fundamentally wrong basis because the commissioners considered the benefits to an adjoining lot used in connection with the lot assessed, where there was no evidence or inference that any benefit to such adjoining lot was considered, and the assessment objected to was less than the amount assessed to other property similarly situated.</p>

<p>Corporations—Dissolution—Statutes—Effect—Actions. A corporation, delinquent in its license fees, is dissolved by tbe secretary of state’s notation of dissolution entered upon its failure to apply for reinstatement witbin' six months, pursuant to Rem. Code, § 3715d, which, provides that thereupon the corporation shall be dissolved and its property shall vest in the trustees; so that the corporation cannot be thereafter sued by service of process upon its president, or jurisdiction acquired of an action to foreclose a tax lien on its property without making the trustees parties.</p> <p>Same—Dissolution—License Fees—Constitutional Law — Due Process of Law. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 3715, providing that the names of corporations shall be stricken from the records of the secretary of state and the corporation dissolved for failure to pay the annual license fees, unless reinstated under § 3715a, is not unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of the state or Federal constitutions.</p> <p>Same—Dissolution—Validity—Premature Entry. Under Rem. Code, § 3715d, providing for the dissolution of delinquent corporations failing to apply for reinstatement within six months, hy the entry of a notation hy the secretary of state upon his records, a dissolution is not invalid from the fact that the secretary made the notation one day too soon, where the record was left standing subsequent to the time when it ought to have been made, since the making of the notation was a ministerial act.</p> <p>Same—Dissolution—Statutes—Amendment— Effect — Actions. Where a corporation was stricken from the records and dissolved under the act of 1909, Rem. & Bal. Code, § 3715a-3715d, for failing to pay its license fees or apply for reinstatement within six months, prior to the amendment of that act by the act of 1911, Rem. Code, § 3715a, which authorized a reinstatement of stricken corporations at any time and rendered the former provision for dissolution inoperative, such dissolution is effectual while the corporation remains in a dormant condition, so that it cannot be sued in the absence of any steps for its reinstatement.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered March 27, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Grays Harbor county, Sheeks, J., entered April 15, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action in tort.</p>

Frank H. Rudkin, judge pro tempore, entered February 3, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendant, dismissing an action to recover under a stock subscription contract.

, entered August 4s, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action seeking the seizure and destruction of intoxicating liquors shipped into the state in violation of the prohibition law, after a trial on the merits to the court without a jury.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Spokane county* Sullivan, J., entered September 6, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained through a defective highway.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Gilford, J., entered June 26, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $£,000 for services as a physician.</p>

, entered July 1, 1916, granting a new trial, after the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action for contribution.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurs-ton county, Mitchell, J., entered January 11, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action on promissory notes and to foreclose a chattel mortgage, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Physicians and Surgeons—Dentists—Defective Work—-Liability. A dentist is liable for damages for pain and suffering caused a patient by defective and unsanitary sets of teeth which did not fulfill the representations and warranty made by him.</p> <p>Pleading—-Issues and Proof. Failure of proof as to some items of the complaint does not affect the right to a recovery for others.</p>

Application filed in the supreme court April 20, 1917, for a writ of mandamus to compel the superior court for Spokane county, Webster, J., to enter a judgment of dismissal.

<p>Municipal Corporations—Improvements—Contracts—Construction—Demurrage—Defenses. A contractor for port terminals cannot escape the payment of demurrage for delay caused by another contractor, where the contract signed by him provided that the port should not be answerable to one contractor for any damage or loss suffered through the fault of any other contractor; and it is immaterial that such clause was not in the specifications upon which he submitted his bid.</p> <p>Same. A contractor for port terminals cannot escape the payment of demurrage for delay caused by the unwarranted rejection of material by an inspector, where he had signed an agreement with the port in settlement of the matter expressly declaring that the port was not responsible for the delay.</p> <p>Same. Where, upon a dispute as to demurrage due from a contractor for port terminals, the parties agreed upon the stipulated damages to that date, in order to enable the contractor to go ahead with the work, payments thereafter made on the contract do not waive the demurrage then agreed upon.</p> <p>Same — Demurrage — Delay — Evidence. Upon an issue as to whether a contractor was responsible for delay whereby demurrage attached, the evidence of a former engineer who had resigned, to the effect that he would have advised waiver of the demurrage, on a “broad basis of general human fairness,” is immaterial, especially where his testimony indicates that the contractor was responsible for the delay.</p>

<p>Appeal—Preservation op Grounds—Specific Motions. Where, in an action for injuries at a railroad crossing, the evidence presented an issue as to defendant’s negligence on the theory of last clear chance, error cannot he predicated upon the denial of a general motion for judgment challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, although other questions of negligence and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence should have been taken from the jury, had the court been requested to do so.</p> <p>Railroads — Crossing Accidents— Negligence— Last Clear Chance—Evidence—Sufficiency. The doctrine of last clear chance applies where the engineer upon a train approaching a crossing, saw, at a distance of 700 or 800 feet, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have seen, the plaintiff’s traction engine on the crossing, stalled near the railroad tracks in a position of peril, but did nothing to attempt to stop the train until within 100 feet of the crossing, when it was too late to avoid a collision, and it appears that the train should have been stopped and was stopped within a distance of 500 or 600 feet.</p>

<p>Municipal Corporations — Local Improvements — Bonds — Payment—Statutes. Where local improvement bonds were issued under ordinances and the law of 1899, p. 238, § 9, providing that each bond should be payable only out of the local improvement fund and that there should be no claim thereon against the city, except by enforcement of the special assessment, the city council had no- power to provide for their payment, in case of a deficit, by the creation of a local improvement district surplus fund, made up from the surplus moneys in the funds of improvement districts, the bonds to be assigned to the city, nor in any other way than as limited by law to the special assessments against the property.</p> <p>Same. A local improvement district surplus fund, for the payment of deficits in local improvement funds, which is “subject to disposition by the city as it shall see fit” is absolutely within the city’s discretion, which, in the absence of fraud or arbitrary mismanagement, cannot be controlled by mandate in the interest of bondholders seeking to have the same applied to the payment of their bonds.</p> <p>Same—Representation—Statements by Officers. A city treasurer and councilman has no power to bind the city by a statement or representation to a purchaser of local improvement bonds, buying the same from a contractor, which would set aside the provisions of the law or ordinances or enlarge the liability of the city.</p>

<p>Divorce—Decree—Res Judicata—Subsequent Action. A decree of separate maintenance denying a husband a divorce is res adjudicate/ as to all matters occurring between the parties up to that time, and also conclusive that the husband was in default, entitling the wife to live separate and apart; but it is not res adjudicata as to subsequent misconduct.</p> <p>Same—Abandonment. The refusal by a wife, living separate and apart from a husband under a decree of separate maintenance, of the husband’s good faith offer to resume the marriage relation, constitutes abandonment if continued for the statutory period of one year.</p> <p>Same—Abandonment—Complaint. A complaint alleging that the husband, subsequent to a decree of separate maintenance, requested in good faith that the wife return to him, and that she refused, preferring to live separate and apart, is sufficient to raise the question of his good faith as a question of fact, under the rule of law encouraging reconciliations and the resumption of the marriage relation.</p>

, entered November 22, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to vacate a decree of divorce on the ground of fraud, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Mason county, Mitchell, J., entered October 30, 1916, in favor of the plaintiff upon the pleadings, in an action to recover a tax paid.</p>

, entered June 26, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action by a surety to determine the validity of claims to a fund due a contractor on state work, tried to the court.

, entered May 9, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover damages for fraudulent representations.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Franklin county, Linn, J., entered May 9, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action on contract.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors—Illegal Shipment—Criminal Liability— Shipper. One who, in tbe state of Illinois, delivers a shipment of liquor to a common carrier to be transported to this state, without having secured a permit as required hy the prohibition law, Rem. Code, § 6262-1 et seq., is criminally responsible therefor as a participant and instigator of the offense, if not as the actual shipper; there being no distinction between principals and accessories.</p> <p>Same—Illegal Shipment—Criminal Liability—Acts oe Agent. One who ships liquor into this state in violation of the prohibition law, through the instrumentality of an agent, is liable as though he had personally participated, although out of the jurisdiction; and a common carrier may be made the agent in this sense.</p> <p>Same—Illegal Shipment—Jurisdiction—Venue. The shipment of liquor into this state in violation of the prohibition law, through the instrumentality of a common carrier, is a continuing act, cognizable in the jurisdiction where the shipment terminated, and the venue is properly laid at the place of termination.</p> <p>Same—Illegal Shipment— Statutes — Construction—“Within” and “Into.” Rem. Code, § 6262-18, prohibiting the shipment of liquor “within” the state without first securing a permit therefor, prohibits shipments “into” the state, in view of the evident intent and purpose of the act as a prohibition measure supplanting former regulative provisions, the act providing with particularity how a permit may be obtained to ship liquors from places outside the state into the state.</p> <p>Statutes—Executive Construction. Executive construction of an initiative measure, while not a controlling circumstance, is persuasive as to its proper meaning.</p> <p>Commerce—Interstate Commerce—Intoxicating Liquors—State Regulation. The prohibition initiative measure (Laws 1915, p. 2) relating to intoxicating liquors, in so far as it regulates shipments into the state, is not an unlawful interference with interstate commerce; since, by the Webb-Kenyon act, 37 U. S. Stat. at L., p. 699, ch. 90, Congress, in declaring unlawful the shipment of intoxicating liquors into a state to be received, possessed, sold or used in violation of any law of such state, has divested intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in so far as the power of the state to regulate the sale and disposition is concerned.</p>

<p>Criminal Law—Appeal—Review—Verdict. A conviction will not be set aside for insufficiency of tbe evidence where it cannot be said that the evidence fails to support it.</p>

<p>Application filed in the supreme court March 28, 1917, for a writ of prohibition to the superior court for King county, Frater, J., to restrain the granting of a new trial.</p>

<p>Estoppel—Equitable Estoppel—Ownership oe Goods. Where a mother allowed her minor son to conduct a business and use therein personal property which she had «loaned to him, and to mortgage and hold himself out as the owner thereof, she is estopped, as against his creditors, from asserting that she was the owner thereof.</p>

<p>Motion filed in the supreme court June 7, 1917, to vacate a judgment pending appeal therefrom.</p>

, entered November 18, 1915, dismissing an action to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

<p>Fraud—Misrepresenting Financial Standing — Evidence—Sufficiency. Damages for fraudulently misrepresenting the financial standing of a concern, which a hank officer, upon inquiry, assured the plaintiff was in good condition and would unquestionably take care of a credit about to be extended, cannot be recovered where it does not appear that the statements were made recklessly without knowledge of the truth, or as a positive statement, and the officer informed the plaintiff that the party was indebted to the bank and declined to take the note without recourse; especially where plaintiff was not satisfied and did not rely on the statements, but prosecuted further inquiry from another bank.</p>

<p>Judsment—Parties Concluded. A decision on appeal in a former action between the same parties as to the sufficiency of a claim filed against an estate is conclusive in a subsequent action.</p> <p>Election of Remedies—Distinct Remedies—Liens and Breach of Contract. Since there can be no lien upon wood for loss of profits through breach of a contract for cutting, an action to foreclose a lien for the cutting of wood is not an election of remedies barring a subsequent action to recover damages for loss of profits through breach of the contract.</p> <p>Appeal—Review—Verdicts. A verdict upon questions of fact submitted to the jury is conclusive on appeal.</p> <p>Appeal—Review—Waiver of Error. Error in denying motions for nonsuit and for a bill of particulars, are waived, where the appellant went to trial and was not prejudiced in presenting the different defenses relied upon.</p> <p>Contracts—Breach—Actions—Instructions. In an action for breach of contract, an instruction authorizing verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant paid “for the number of monthly installments, and refused to pay one or more thereafter,” is not susceptible of the construction that it authorizes the jury to find for plaintiff if defendant did not pay money on the day it became due.</p>

, entered June 30, 1916, favorable to the defendants, in an action for an injunction, after a trial on the merits before the court.

<p>Criminal Law—Venue—Change—Discretion — Local Prejudice —Review. The denial of a change of venue in a criminal case on account of local prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and no abuse of discretion is shown, where it appears that on a former trial a jury disagreed and statements of the trial judge criticizing the jury and commenting upon the sufficiency of the evidence were published in the newspapers, hut affidavits were filed to the effect that no prejudice was created by such publications and that defendant could have a fair trial in the county.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Trial—Misconduct or Counsel in Argument. It is not error for the prosecuting attorney to state in argument that he fully believed in the guilt of the accused, where it was in reply to a statement that he did not have- the courage to dismiss when a former jury disagreed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Smith, J., entered April 14, 1916, dismissing an action for equitable relief, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

Cross-appeals from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered May 13, 1916, in favor of the plaintiffs as to part of the defendants and dismissing as to one defendant, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for wrongful death.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered September 20, 1916, denying a petition'to vacate a judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Chapman, J., entered November 13, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for rent, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Municipal Corporations—Officers—Ordinances — Construction. Tbe “manager” of a sub-department of tbe light department of a city, provided for by ordinance, who was to be nominated by a commissioner and confirmed by the council, is an “officer” of the city within charter provisions classifying all persons in the service of the city and providing for a class of appointive officers to be so nominated and confirmed and to include named officers and “such other chiefs or superintendents of departments as the council shall by ordinance . . . create or establish.”</p> <p>Contracts—Public Policy—Officers—Salary. An agreement by an officer before appointment to accept a less salary than that fixed by law is void as against public policy.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations—Officers—Salary—Right to — Acceptance. Where an officer’s salary is fixed by ordinance, which could be repealed or suspended only by ordinance, he is entitled to recover the full salary, notwithstanding the officer appointing him informed him that he would receive a less salary, and for a period of over two years he accepted monthly salary warrants acknowledging payment in full for services rendered.</p> <p>Accord and Satisfaction—Consideration—Acceptance of Less Sum—Officer’s Salary. Where a salary is fixed by law, acknowledgment of a less sum in full payment for all services rendered is not an accord and satisfaction, since there was no consideration, and no question of contract or public policy is involved.</p> <p>Interest—Officer’s Salary—Damages. Where a salary is fixed by law, the officer cannot recover interest on back salary retained from monthly payments, prior to the commencement of action therefor, as the same is recoverable only as damages.</p>

<p>Theaters and Shows—Regulation—Ordinance—Construction— Offenses—Offensive Pictures—Approval. In a prosecution for violating a city ordinance that positively prohibited the display of offensive picture films of a described sort, the approval of the advisory committee is no defense, where by the ordinance the committee was to assist in the enforcement of the ordinance, which' provided that a film must be displayed to the committee upon demand and that no film shall be displayed after examination unless approved, there being no power to approve prohibited films (Parker, J., dissenting).</p> <p>Same—Regulation—Offenses-—Good Faith. Good faith is no defense to a prosecution for the violation of an ordinance prohibiting the display of offensive pictures, as intent is conclusively presumed from the act.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Evidence—Admissibility. Upon a prosecution for violation of an ordinance regulating picture shows, evidence of a conversation showing that defendant was the person who exhibited, and which also showed evil intent, does not open the door to evidence in rebuttal showing absence of knowledge and intent; the defendant’s remedy being by motion to strike.</p> <p>Same — Trial-—-Instructions. Where an instruction correctly stated the law and issues, the fact that it contained unnecessary verbiage is not error.</p>

<p>Application filed in the supreme court February 27, 1917, for a writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court for Grant county, Hill, J., from trying a cause after denying a change of venue.</p>

, entered January 9, 1917, upon findings in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for equitable relief, tried to the court.

<p>Receiveks — Appointment — Grounds — Complaint—Sufficiency. The court has no power to appoint a receiver of a corporation in an action at law upon an open account where the complaint does not indicate in any way that any hind of equitable relief is ashed, there being no showing that would even bring the case within Rem. Code, § 741, subd. 6th, providing for the appointment of receivers in “such other cases as may he provided by law, or when, in the discretion of the court, it may be necessary to secure ample justice to the parties.”</p>

, entered May 25, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendant, in an action to cancel a sale of corporate stock, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Chapman, J., entered October 6, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, George H.'Walker, Judge pro tempore, entered July 11, 1916, in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Klickitat county, Darch, J., entered June 7, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for divorce.</p>

, entered May 6, 1916, upon a trial and conviction of violating an ordinance regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors.

<p>Cbiminal Law—Continuance — Subprise — Indorsement oe New Witnesses. Under Rem. Code, § 2050, requiring the prosecuting attorney, at the time of filing an information, to indorse the names of witnesses known to him, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse a continuance, needed for the investigation of witnesses, where the prosecuting attorney, one working day before the trial, was by ex parte order, permitted to indorse the names of nine additional witnesses known to him at the time of filing the information, and which he had refused to disclose and had apparently concealed until the last possible moment, although they were worthy subjects of investigation and apparently unworthy of belief.</p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors—-Prosecution—Issues and Proof. Upon a prosecution of a druggist for keeping intoxicating liquors named in the information, intended for unlawful sale, it is error to admit evidence of the sale of alcohol, not specified in the information, as a circumstance bearing on the guilt of the accused; especially where the sale of alcohol was made for mechanical purposes in strict compliance with the law.</p> <p>Same—Information—Time—Materiality. Upon a prosecution of a druggist for keeping intoxicating liquors intended for unlawful sale, on or about the 24th day of March, evidence or the presence of liquors on the premises four days later is admissible, inasmuch as it is provided by statute that the precise time is not a material allegation.</p> <p>Same—Offenses—Statutes—Sale. The fact that a person procures alcohol of a druggist by making a false statement, in violation of the statute, does not make the sale, in strict compliance with the statute, unlawful.</p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors—Offenses—Intent — Evidence — Admissibility. Upon the prosecution of a druggist for keeping intoxicating liquors intended for unlawful sale, the quantity and kind of liquor kept on hand by the defendant is material, but not conclusive, to show that he had in possession quantities and kinds in excess of his apparent needs.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors—Offenses—Keeping Liquors—Punishment —Statutes. Rem. Code, § 6262-5, authorizes fine and imprisonment, as well as an abatement of the premises, for unlawfully keeping intoxicating liquors for sale, the one penalty being directed against the premises and the other against the violator; in view of the fact that it makes such act unlawful and provides for abatement of the nuisance “upon conviction of any violation of the act,” and for the giving of a bond, conditioned to pay all “fines, costs, and damages” that may be assessed; since § 6262-5, recognizes that a fine may be imposed for its violation without specific mention of the extent of the fine, and the amount is therefore controlled by § 6262-31, which provides that upon conviction of-any violation of the act where the punishment is not specifically provided for, there may be imposed a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $250, or imprisonment for not less than ten days, nor more than three months, or both such fine and imprisonment.</p>

, entered October 18, 1916, dismissing an action upon a bond, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Tallman, J., entered July 10, 1916, in favor of the defendant, upon granting a nonsuit, in an action for personal injuries.</p>

<p>Deeds—Delivery to Agent—Intent—Effect. The execution of a deed intended as a testamentary disposition, and delivery to an agent to be delivered to the grantee after the grantor’s death, is not effectual as a conveyance, where the grantor understood that she retained control, and retook possession of the deed, since the delivery must be absolute and beyond recall.</p>

, entered November 3, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for damages from fire.

<p>Trial—Bindings op Bact—Necessity. In an action at law in which issues of fact are tried out on the merits before the court without a jury, findings of fact are necessary to support the judgment; under Rem. Code, § 367, providing that, upon the trial of an issue of fact by the court, its decision shall be given in writing, with the facts found and the conclusions of law separately stated.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered November 18, 1916, upon findings in favor of the defendants, in an action to quiet title, tried to the court.</p>

, entered April 18, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on a subscription contract, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered June 26, 1916, dismissing garnishment proceedings, after a trial before the court.</p>

, entered November 18, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on promissory notes, tried to the court.

, entered November 18, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover claims for rentals, tried to the court.

<p>Principal and Agent—Relation—Termination—Evidence—Sufficiency—Notice of Cancellation. The evidence sustains findings that an agency was mutually cancelled on February 13, and the matter kept secret to give the agent an opportunity to dispose of cars on hand, where a letter was written February 26, evidently referring to such previous arrangement and requesting return of the contract, which the agent acquiesced in; and in such case the agent cannot insist upon the ten days’ notice of cancellation provided for in the contract of employment.</p>

<p>Indictment and Information—Duplicity—Pending Plea. The question of duplicity in an information can only be raised by demurrer or motion to quash, or by motion to compel an election, and same will not be entertained while a plea of not guilty is pending.</p> <p>Constitutional Law—Legislative Functions. Whether the seventh amendment to the state constitution is violative of U. S. Const., art. 4, § 4, guaranteeing a republican form of government, is a Federal question, and the Federal courts uniformly hold that the guarantee is of a political character exclusively committed to Congress and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.</p> <p>United States—Republican Form of Government. The admission by Congress of Senators and Representatives from this state since the adoption of the seventh amendment to the state constitution, conclusively recognizes the republican character of our state government under the amendment.</p> <p>Commerce—Intoxicating Liquors—Regulation of States. Rem. Code, § 6262-20, is not violative of the commerce clause of the Federal constitution, since the Webb-Kenyon act (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, § 8739) authorizes state legislation controlling interstate shipments of intoxicating liquors, and divests such shipments of their character of interstate commerce when violative of state law.</p> <p>Same— Offenses — Illegal Transportation — Evidence — Sufficiency. A conviction for transporting liquors not labeled as required by law, is sustained where it appears that the accused operated a jitney, and was hired by others to go to Montana, and returned with two half-gallon jugs and one five-gallon demijohn of whiskey in the car, none of the containers having the required permit attached, the accused lending himself and his car to the unlawful enterprise after having knowledge of the presence of the whiskey shortly after reentering this state.</p>

<p>Mortgages—Foreclosure—Sale—Possession—Rights of Second Mortgagee—Writ of Assistance. -Where a second mortgagee foreclosed against the mortgagors only, and prior to his obtaining possession as purchaser under the sale, a prior mortgage was foreclosed and the purchaser at such sale obtained possession, the second mortgagee has rights as a redemptioner only, and is not entitled to a writ of assistance to put him in possession.</p> <p>Certiorari—Application—Statement of Grounds. A writ of certiorari to review error will not be granted, unless the application points out the specific error committed, when none appears on the face of the record, and it is not sufficient to state that the action "was erroneous and not according to the rules of the common law.”</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered June 1, 1916, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action for divorce, tried to the court.</p>

, entered February 24, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action to recover upon a foreign judgment, tried to the court.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Gilliam, J., entered October 26, 1916, in favor of the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for conversion.</p>

<p>Executors and Administrators—Claims—-Presentation and Payment—Judoments. Under Rem. Code, § 1483, providing an orderly method for the presentation and payment of claims against estates, the same must he followed and claim presented for a judgment for costs, rendered against an administratrix in her action brought against the claimant.</p> <p>Appeal—Orders Appealable—Final Orders. An order in probate, upon a citation to compel payment of judgment for costs, requiring the administratrix to pay the costs and providing, in case of default, that her letters “are hereby revoked,” is a final order and appealable.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Okanogan county, Geo. S. Lee, judge pro tempore, entered December 13, 1916, in favor of the defendants, fixing the compensation of executors of an estate, after a hearing upon objections to the final account thereof.</p>

, entered October 2é, 1916, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, dismissing an action to set aside an order of the board of county commissioners upon appeal from a decision of the superintendent of schools.

<p>Contracts—Building Contracts—Performance or Breach—Pinal Payment—Outstanding Bills. Under a contract for the construction of a building for the sum of $47,000, $35,000 of which was raised by a first mortgage and used in the payment of bills in the progress of the work, the contract providing that the balance shall be paid by a second mortgage to the contractor upon the completion of the building, the owner is not bound to execute the second mortgage while bills and claims for liens against the building were outstanding, which the contractor refused to satisfy as his duty under the contract required.</p> <p>Same. The fact that the owner of the building took a surety bond guaranteeing the faithful completion of the work, was merely an additional protection, and did not require the owner to rely wholly upon the bond and make final payment before the contractor had paid bills and claims for liens.</p> <p>Mortgages—Priority-—Mechanics’ Liens. Where the contractor, at the time of entering into the contract, knew that a mortgage was to be given as a prior lien to raise money to pay for the work, the mortgage is prior to the claims of the contractor, although work was commenced before the mortgage was executed and filed, notwithstanding Rem. Code, § 1132, providing that a mechanics’ lien is preferred to any incumbrance attaching subsequent to the commencement of the work.</p> <p>Same. Under Rem. Code, § 1132, providing that a mechanics’ lien is preferred to any incumbrance attaching subsequent to the commencement of the work for which the lien is given, a mortgage given to raise money to pay bills and expenses incurred in the progress of the work, but filed subsequent to the commencement of work on the -building, is superior to claims for materials furnished to the contractor long after the mortgage was made and recorded.</p>

<p>Judgment—Vacation—Jurisdiction. The superior court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the vacation of judgments; and final orders therein are as conclusive as other judgments.</p> <p>Eminent Domain — Judgment Awarding Damages — Vacation. Rem. Code, § 7783, providing that judgments in eminent domain shall be final and conclusive as to the damages unless appealed from, was not intended to control the power of the superior courts to vacate and set aside such judgments as provided in the general statutes, Rem. Code, § 464; in view of Const., art. 1, § 16, providing that compensation in eminent domain shall be ascertained “as in other civil cases.”</p> <p>Same. The fact that the judgment in eminent domain proceedings has been satisfied does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to vacate it, as against the judgment creditor duly served with process.</p> <p>Same—Judgment—Awarding Damages— Vacation—Satisfaction by Warrants—Rights of Assignee—Notice. The vacation of a judgment for damages in eminent domain proceedings, for which a city warrant had been issued in satisfaction of the judgment, is binding and conclusive upon an assignee of the warrant, where the city had no notice of the assignment, and proceeded against the judgment creditor as the apparent party in interest; since such warrants are not negotiable instruments precluding settlement with the judgment creditor apparently holding the judgment, especially where no local assessment fund had been provided for the payment of the warrant.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations—Assessments—Warrants—Liability— Failure to Provide Fund. The failure of a city to provide a local assessment fund for the payment of a warrant given in satisfaction of a judgment for damages payable out of the fund, does not make the warrant a general fund warrant.</p>

Steele, judge pro tempore, entered September 8, 1916, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained through a defective street, tried to the court.

<p>Taxation—Assessment—Excessiveness—Evidence—Sufficiency. An assessment of coal lands for taxation will not be set aside as excessive where it was unquestionably supported by the testimony of two experts of undoubted learning and familiarity with the facts necessarily involved in their opinion, in view of the rule that the opinion of taxing officers in fixing land values will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of arbitrariness of inequality, and the fact that the law presumes that the assessor fully performed his duty.</p> <p>Appeal—Review—Errors Favorable to Appellant. Owners, alleging excessive taxation of coal lands, cannot complain of the methods of the court in reducing the assessments, in that it gave the owners the advantage of a reduction whenever certain expert witnesses testified to no value or did not uphold the assessor’s valuation; since it was favorable rather than unfavorable to them.</p>

<p>Appeal—Record—Abstract. Upon cross-appeals, the defendant’s abstract of the record will not be stricken because the defendant took no exceptions to the findings nor because defendant’s brief did not sufficiently refer to the pages of the abstract, where it may be treated as supplemental to the plaintiffs’ abstract, which the statute permits, and has been useful in marshaling the contents of the record.</p> <p>Taxation—Valuation for Assessment—Excessiveness—Evidence —Sufficiency. An assessment of timber and timber lands for taxation will be set aside as arbitrary and discriminatory where the assessor adopted old valuations without revision in the face of a depreciation in the market value, and without applying the 50 per cent basis for assessment, and in applying the zone system without relation to the quality or accessibility of the timber on any given tract, which was prohibitive of the exercise of any personal judgment on the part of the taxing officers.</p> <p>Same. The valuation of all hemlock timber at the flat rate of 25 cents per thousand throughout the county will be set aside as excessive or arbitrary, where the evidence shows that hemlock had such value only where it is in sufficient quantity and accessible, and that much of it was of little commercial value, having only a speculative future, and that the assessor adopted without change the work of a prior assessor made at a time when the market was higher.</p> <p>Sam:e. An assessment of timber and timber lands will not be set aside because the assessor in addition to the value of the timber included a “land value,” where there was evidence that logged-off lands were of some value, and there was no separate assessment of the land, the statute, Rem. Code, §§ 9095, 9222-1, permitting the separate assessment of timber only in case of separate ownership; but the assessor having adopted a 60 per cent instead of a 50 per cent basis of valuation for assessment purposes, a reduction will be made accordingly to correspond with other classes of property.</p> <p>Same—Excessive Assessment—Evidence—Admissibility. In an action to reduce excessive assessments, evidence of assessments in prior years is admissible for the purpose of showing that the prior assessments were adopted and were made on a basis of 60 per cent when the law now in force requires a fifty per cent basis.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Edward H. Wright, J., entered December 16, 1916, in favor of a certain lien claimant, in an action to determine conflicting claims of creditors to the distributive share in real property inherited by a judgment debtor, tried to the court.</p>

, entered July 9, 1917, in favor of the plaintiffs, upon overruling demurrers to the complaints, in an action for an injunction.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Chapman, J., entered March 10, 1916, in favor of the defendants, in an action to recover possession of a deed, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Insurance—Regulation—Powers oe Commissioner—Discretion —Review—Mandamus. Under Rem. Code, § 6059-86, providing for permits to mutual insurance companies to write other classes of insurance, upon furnishing additional assets, if the “plans, terms, and conditions prescribed and adopted” he “found to he efficient and adequate” to meet its obligations, “of which the commissioner shall he the judge,” mandamus will not lie to compel the insurance commissioner to issue a permit for fidelity and surety insurance, where the record fails to disclose what showing was made as to the efficiency and adequacy of its plans, etc., the only showing being as to the additional assets; since it cannot be determined that the commissioner’s refusal was arbitrary or capricious; and in any event, he could only he compelled to exercise his discretion.</p>

F. Wright, J., entered July 9, 1917, granting a writ of mandamus requiring the secretary of state to file referendum petitions and canvass the names signed thereto, after a trial to the court.

<p>Railroads—Crossing Accidents—Negligence—Evidence — Sufficiency. It is negligence to run an electric train through a deep cut onto a much used crossing, where the view from the road was obstructed, at 50 miles per hour, without any warning except a faint whistle the instant before reaching the crossing.</p> <p>Same—Crossing Accidents—Contributory Negligence—Question for Jury. The contributory negligence of the driver of an automobile, struck by an electric train at a crossing, is for the jury, where the crossing was in a deep cut, he approached the tracks at about one mile per hour, looking all the time for an approaching train, but owing to obstruction of the view, it was impossible for him to see the train, approaching at high speed, until the front end of the automobile was about six inches from the rail, when an attempt to reverse and back up would have been more hazardous than to attempt to cross.</p> <p>Same—Crossing Accident—Last Clear Chance. The doctrine of last clear chance has no application, where, if there was contributory negligence, it continued up to the instant of the collision; nor where there was no contributory negligence, as the rule presupposes the existence of contributory negligence.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Clallam county, Ralston, J., entered November 28, 1916, upon a trial and conviction of blackmail.</p>

<p>Rape—Evidence—Complaint — Admissibility. In a prosecution for rape, while the fact of complaints made is admissible, it is error to allow the person to whom the complaints were made to give the details and particulars of the complaint as related to him, since the same would be hearsay.</p> <p>Same—Evidence—Complaints—Res Gestae. In a prosecution for rape, details and particulars of a complaint made, narrating the occurrences of the previous evening, are not admissible as part of the res gestae, as it was not the utterance of instinctive words.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Appeal—Harmless Eeros, When there was a conflict in the testimony and a question for the jury, the reversal of a conviction cannot be denied for error in admitting illegal evidence upon the vital issue in the case, merely because guilt was overwhelmingly established by other evidence.</p>

, entered January 15, 1916, in favor of the plaintiff, upon overruling a demurrer to the complaint, in an action to recover money paid.

<p>Btjrglaby—Evidence—Identification. In a prosecution for burglary, a general identification of the accused, as, in witness’ best belief, the man who had been seen with a stolen car, is sufficient without proof of particular marks or peculiarity.</p> <p>Burglary—Evidence—Sufficiency. A conviction of burglary is sustained by evidence that a garage was broken open and a car stolen therefrom on the night of defendant’s arrival at the place, that the car was tracked to and abandoned at S. early the next morning, after a hard trip, having stopped enroute at a garage, and the accused was identified as the man who had driven it there, and that he left S. that day, having in his possession a number of automobile keys for different makes of cars.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Evidence—Admissibility. In a prosecution for burglary of a garage and stealing a car, it is admissible, as part of the circumstantial evidence, to introduce the license plates found on the car which had been changed to prevent identification; the clothing worn by the accused, for the purpose of comparison to aid a witness in identifying accused as the driver of the car; and keys of various automobiles, found in the possession of the accused, in the nature of criminal tools and implements constituting a suspicious circumstance.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Clarke county, Back, J., entered August 31, 1916, upon a trial and conviction of robbery.</p>

<p>Principal and Surety—Official Bond—Judgment Against Principal. A judgment against a sheriff for a wrongful levy is not conclusive upon the sureties upon his official bond conditioned merely for the faithful discharge of the sheriff’s duties, but is no more than prima facie of the merits in a subsequent case against the sureties, casting the burden of proof upon them.</p> <p>Same—Actions—Official Bonds—Defenses of Surety. In an action upon a sheriff’s official bond to collect a judgment recovered against the sheriff for a wrongful levy, the sureties’ answer setting up the lawfulness of the sheriff’s acts states a good defense as to the sureties.</p>

<p>Forcible Entry and Detainer—Redelivery Bond—Liability. In forcible entry and detainer, the surety is bound by judgment for the plaintiffs, under a redelivery bond given to enable defendant to retain possession, conditioned to pay the plaintiffs any sum found due and also all costs of the action.</p> <p>Same—Appeal—Stay Bond. Under Rem. Code, § 832, an appeal will not stay proceedings in forcible entry and detainer unless a bond is given to pay all rent and other damages pending the appeal.</p> <p>Same—Redelivery Bond—Liability—Actions. Where the judgment in forcible entry and detainer was not stayed and execution against the defendant was returned nulla J)ona, action may be brought against defendant’s sureties on his redelivery bond, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.</p> <p>Appeal—Supersedeas—Writ op Error—Limitations — Power op Supreme Court. A writ of error to the United States Supreme Court does not operate as a supersedeas in any case, under U. S. Rev. St., § 1007, when not sued out within sixty days after the decision appealed from, and the state supreme court cannot grant a supersedeas after the right is lost by lapse of time.</p>

, entered January 22, 1917, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the defendant, in an action to recover assets of an insolvent.

<p>Actions—Joinder—Legal or Equitable. Under Rem. Code, § 153, authorizing an action for both legal and equitable relief, an action by a vendee for false representations in the sale of land is cognizable in equity where it seeks damages and relief from liability upon notes given for the purchase price, and to restrain the negotiation of the notes to an innocent holder.</p> <p>Vendor and Purchaser—Fraud—Inspection — Evidence — Sufficiency. Relief for false representations by a vendor in the sale of land is not warranted by the evidence, where it appears that misrepresentations as to a boundary were eliminated by the acceptance of a deed correcting it, that the vendee inspected the premises and was aware of the rocky and gravelly character of the soil which had been misrepresented, and any statement as to the amount of the cleared land could have been no more than an estimate, and the vendee had full opportunity to estimate it before buying.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors—Sale—Information. An information for selling a quart of “spirituous intoxicating liquors . . . capable of being used as a beverage,” is sufficient as being substantially in the language of Rem. Code, §§ 6262-2 and 6262-4, prohibiting the sale of any intoxicating liquor.</p> <p>Jury—Qualifications—Bias. A juror is not disqualified by acquaintance with the prosecuting attorney and confidence in. his ability and integrity.</p> <p>Same. In a prosecution for selling liquor, a juror is not disqualified by the fact that she favors the prohibition law.</p> <p>Criminal Law—‘Evidence — Confessions. Admissions, of guilt made to police officers while in their custody are admissible against accused, when they were freely and voluntarily made, since they were not made under the influence of fear produced by threats.</p> <p>Trial—Comment on Evidence. It is not error, as comment on the evidence, for the court, in a colloquy with counsel, to correctly state what the evidence was upon a point in question.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Reasonable Doubt—Instructions. A' reasonable doubt is properly defined as a substantial doubt having reason for its basis, as distinguished from a fanciful or imaginary doubt, and such as arises from the evidence or want of evidence, and the absence of which would, after deliberation, enable one to have a settled and abiding conviction of guilt.</p> <p>Trial—Instructions—Submission. It cannot be presumed that the bracketing of parts of an instruction, taken to the jury room, unduly influenced the jury.</p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors—Sale—Delivery—Evidence—Sufficiency. A delivery of intoxicating liquor unlawfully sold is sufficiently proven where it appears that accused, after making the bargain to sell, said that he would leave the bottle with the liquor behind a broom in a certain place and that the purchaser found it there and took it away.</p> <p>Criminal Law—Harmless Error—Cure by Instructions. Prejudicial error cannot be predicated upon misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in starting to comment on the fact that the defendant had not testified, where the court immediately checked such statement and instructed the jury that no inference could be drawn from defendant’s failure to testify.</p> <p>Same—Trial-Instructions—Credibility oe Employed Witnesses. Where the jury are instructed to consider the interest and bias of all witnesses, it is not error to refuse an instruction respecting the weight to be given and the interest of witnesses employed by the prosecuting attorney to obtain evidence against the accused.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Thurs-ton county, Mitchell, J., entered March 13, 1916, dismissing an action for an accounting, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.</p>

<p>Appeal—Record—Statement op Facts—Priority op Claims—Receivers. A hearing had upon notice to fix the priority of claims in a receivership, raises a mixed question of law, which can he reversed on appeal only by bringing up in the record the facts upon which it is based.</p> <p>Receivers — Priority op Claims — Determination — Pleadings. Upon a hearing to fix the priority of claims in a receivership, a written denial of a claim of priority is not necessary, inasmuch as priority will be determined irrespective of any claim made.</p> <p>Receivers—Claims—Priorities. A claim for personal injuries sustained in the operation of a road prior to a receivership should not be given a preference over prior mortgages.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Jurey, J., entered September 80, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for personal injuries sustained through a defective street.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for . King county, Ronald, J., entered October 24, 1916, confirming a reassessment roll for a public improvement, after a hearing before the court.</p>

' Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Smith, J., entered January 5, 1917, in favor of the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained by a minor while playing with a scraper.

, entered December 9, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, in an action for personal injuries sustained through a fall upon a sidewalk.

<p>Contempt—Evidence—Sufficiency. Where, upon a hearing for settlement, a guardian admitted that he had the money due his ward in a safe-deposit box, he is guilty of contempt in refusing to pay it over on the judgment entered requiring him to do so; and it is no excuse that the guardian’s brother had raised the money and subsequently refused to allow it to be drawn upon, where no intimation of such fact was made at the hearing.</p> <p>Same—Powers of Court—Imprisonment. Where a guardian was in contempt for failing to pay over money to his ward, as required by a judgment, the court has jurisdiction to adjudge the contempt and commit him to the county jail until the order is complied with.</p> <p>Same—Proceedings—Parties. A contempt proceeding against a guardian for failure to comply with an order to pay money need not be prosecuted in the name of the state.</p>

, entered August 9, 1916, denying a discharge and final settlement of the account of a guardian, after a hearing before the court.

, entered February 15, 1917, denying a writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor to count the names of signers withdrawn from recall petitions.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Smith, J., entered April 2, 1915, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract.</p>

, entered November 18, 1915, dismissing an action to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Cowlitz county, Darch, J., entered September 22, 1914, in favor of the plaintiff, upon overruling a challenge to the evidence.</p>

, entered' March 19, 1915, upon granting a nonsuit, dismissing an action for malpractice, tried to the court and a jury.

, entered December 6, 1915, dismissing an action to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance, upon sustaining a demurrer to the complaint.

, entered January 27, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries sustained hy a locomotive fireman.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered April 26, 1916, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action in tort.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Yakima county, Grady, J., entered July 29,1916, in favor of the defendants, dismissing an action to subject real property to the satisfaction of a judgment, tried to the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Lewis county, Rice, J., entered April 17, 1916, affirming an order of the public service commission, after a hearing before the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from an order of the superior court for King county, Jurey, J., entered September 27, 1916, denying confirmation of an execution sale, upon sustaining objections thereto.</p>