No. 90-1091’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[B]efore addressing the merits of any appeal, [the Court] must be convinced that the claim in question is ripe for review, even if neither party has raised this issue. "The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Article III of the United States Constitution to consideration of actual cases and controversies[;] thereforef,] federal courts are not permitted to render advisory opinions." Adcock v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 822 F.2d 623, 627 (6th Cir.1987). "Ripeness is more than a mere procedural question; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed. This deficiency may be raised sua sponte if not raised by the parties." Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498 , 502 (9th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 943 , 112 S.Ct. 382 , 116 L.Ed.2d 333 (1991) (citation omitted).”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. National Ass'n of Minority Contractors, Dayton Chapter v. Martinez · 248 F. Supp. 2d 679 - NATIONAL ASS'N OF MIN. CONT., DAYTON v. Martinez

2. “addressing the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim at this stage of the proceedings would allow future plaintiffs effectively to circumvent the ripeness requirement for takings claims simply by attaching a procedural due process claim to their complaint.” Bigelow, 970 F.2d at 160 . 4 . The Court does note, however, that the Ninth Circuit has partially retreated from its holding in Palomar. In Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.1995), the Ninth Circuit held;”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 967 F. Supp. 998 - Rainey Bros. Construction Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Board of Adjustment · 35 F. Supp. 2d 1025 - Pond Brook Development, Inc. v. Twinsburg Township

3. “.... The question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is conceptually distinct, however, from the question whether an administrative action must be final before it is judicially reviewable. While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with tohether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. The difference is best illustrated by comparing the procedure for seeking a variance with the procedures that ... respondent would not be required to exhaust. “While it appears that the State provides procedures by which an aggrieved property owner may seek a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of zoning and planning actions taken by county authorities, respondent would not be required to resort to those procedures before bringing its § 1983 action, because those procedures clearly are remedial. Similarly, respondent would not be required to appeal the Commission’s rejection of the preliminary plat to the Board of Zoning Appeals, because the Board was empowered, at most, to review that rejection, not to participate in the Commission’s decisionmaking. Resort to those procedures would result in a judgment wh”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 159 F. Supp. 2d 608 - Vashi v. Charter Township of West Bloomfield · Arnett v. Myers