Volume 970 — North Western Reporter, Second Series

The effect of a judgment decreeing a divorce is to restore the parties to the state of unmarried persons, but neither party to a divorce may marry except in accordance with the decree of the court granting the divorce. Whether a moving party has established a prima facie case for a modification of primary residential responsibility presents a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal. A district court's decision whether to grant a protective order limiting discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A parent moving for permission to relocate has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the move is in the child's best interests. To decide whether relocation is in a child's best interests, the district court applies the four Stout-Hawkinson factors. A district court may award attorney's fees and costs to remedy abuse caused by successive frivolous post-judgment motions.

Failure to comply with provisions of a separation or divorce decree relating to distribution of the parties' property constitutes contempt of court. A person aggrieved by contempt of court may seek imposition of a remedial sanction for the contempt by filing a motion for that purpose. A party seeking a contempt sanction must clearly and satisfactorily prove the alleged contempt was committed. Whether a contempt has been committed lies within the district court's sound discretion, which will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

Constitutional forfeiture doctrine recognized by adopting the hearsay exception under N.D.R.Ev. 804(b)(6). Forfeiture by wrongdoing requires the State to prove (1) that the declarant-witness is unavailable (2) that the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct (3) that the wrongful conduct procured the unavailability of the witness and (4) that the defendant intended to procure the unavailability of the witness. Forfeiture by wrongdoing was properly applied where the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant murdered victim with intent to prevent testimony at criminal proceedings. The State is not required to prove defendant intended to prevent victim from testifying in the same case in which testimony was offered. Intent to prevent testimony in foreseeable proceeding or investigation is sufficient. A sentence is illegal if it is not authorized by the judgment of conviction, and a district court must abide by the terms of the judgment when amending the judgment to include restitution.