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← 970 So. 2d 312 - McDuffie v. State

970 So. 2d 312 - McDuffie v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2007

Citation profile

107
cited by 107 later decisions
1
states following
May 2019
most recently cited

107 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Davis v. Alaska · Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. · Ring v. Arizona · Old Chief v. United States · Taylor v. Illinois

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 107 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[a] trial court’s discretion in this area ... is constrained by the rules of evidence, Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 278 (Fla.2003), and by recognition of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. “The right of a criminal defendant to cross-examine adverse witnesses is derived from the Sixth Amendment and due process right to confront one’s accusers. One accused of crime therefore has an absolute right to full and fair cross-examination.” Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 337 (Fla.1982). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974): Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. The scope of cross-examination is not without bounds, but “where a criminal defendant in a capital ease, while exercising his sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, inquires of a key prosecution witness regarding matters which are both germane to that witness’s testimony on direct examination and plausibly relevant to the defense, an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in ”
    17 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Where the issue involves possible exclusion of defense evidence, the “extreme sanction of excluding [defense] evidence ... should be used only as a last resort” and “it is incumbent upon the trial court ... to determine whether any other reasonable alternatives can be employed to overcome ... possible prejudice,” including declaration of a mistrial. Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). When, as in this case, the discovery violation is committed by the defense, special importance attaches to the trial court’s inquiry into alternative sanctions because exclusion of exculpatory evidence implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to defend himself or herself. See Alexander [v. State], 931 So.2d [946] at 950 [ (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ]; see also McBride v. State, 913 So.2d 696, 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that a criminal defendant has a due process right to present evidence and that exclusion of evidence for a defense disco”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The factors that a court needs to consider when conducting a Richardson hearing to determine if a discovery violation has occurred are: 1) whether the violation was ’ inadvertent or willful; 2) whether it was trivial or substantial, and most importantly; 3) whether it has prejudiced the opposition’s ability 'to prepare for trial!”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.