Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

974 So. 2d 440

Docket No. 2D06-4137.

Graham v. State

Wilson GRAHAM, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided December 19, 2007.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 2007-12-19

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently November 2009

7 state decisions

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · 969 So. 2d 1060 - Powell v. State · Tatum v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2007-12-19

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Dan Hallenberg, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

¶2Bill. McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

¶3DAVIS, Judge.

¶4Wilson Graham challenges his convictions and sentences for first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, and burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery. We affirm.

¶5On appeal, Graham challenges the sufficiency of the Miranda[1] warnings he received and argues that he should not have been sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender because his prior commitments were juvenile commitments.

¶6In Powell v. State,969 So.2d 1060, 1064, 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), this court determined that Miranda warnings that included the phrase, "You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions" were "constitutionally flawed because the right to talk to or consult with an attorney before questioning is not identical to the right of the presence of an attorney during questioning." The warnings given to Graham are distinguishable because they advised that Graham had the right to the presence of an attorney and did not include any timeframe limitation. We therefore affirm on this point without further comment.

¶7With regard to Graham's enhanced sentence, we adopt the reasoning of Tatum v. State,922 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in which the First District concluded that "[b]ecause the statute makes no distinction between youthful offender commitments and adult commitments, *441 . . . the trial court was required to impose the enhanced sentences," even where the prior commitment was in a "youthful offender boot camp."

¶8Affirmed.

¶9SILBERMAN, J., and GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge, Concur.

NOTES

¶10[1] Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

/974/so2d/440 · .json · Public domain