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← 974 So. 2d 565 - Murphy v. YMCA

974 So. 2d 565 - Murphy v. YMCA’s Empirical Analysis

2008

Citation profile

7
cited by 7 later decisions
1
states following
April 2019
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 447 So. 2d 318 - Van Tuyn v. Zurich American Ins. Co. · 403 So. 2d 1144 - GOYINGS EX REL. GOYINGS v. Jack & Ruth Eckerd Found. · Theis v. J & J RACING PROMOTIONS · Southworth & McGill v. S. BELL TEL. AND TELEGRAPH CO. · 359 So. 2d 512 - Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Montagano

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “I am an adult over 18 years of age and wish to participate in Lake Wales Family YMCA activities. In addition I give my children permission to participate in Lake Wales Family YMCA activities. I understand that even when every reasonable precaution is taken, accidents can sometimes still happen. Therefore, in exchange for the YMCA allowing me to participate in YMCA activities, I understand and expressly acknowledge that I release the Lake Wales Family YMCA and its staff members from all liability for any injury, loss or damage connected in any way whatsoever to my (or my children’s) participation in YMCA activities, whether on or off the YMCA’s premises. I understand that this release includes any claims based on negligence, action or inaction of the Lake Wales Family YMCA, its staff, directors, members and guests. I have read and am voluntarily signing this authorization and release.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “A reasonable reader might be led to believe that the waiver of liability extends only to claims for injuries that were unavoidable “even when every reasonable precaution” had been taken by the YMCA. In light of the “every reasonable precaution” language, the waiver does not clearly and unequivocally release the YMCA from liability and is therefore not enforceable. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Montagano, 359 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (“[W]hen we consider that we do not look with favor on exculpatory clauses, we must .require the draftsmen .of all contracts which contain them to use clear and .unequivocal language totally without a hint of deceptive come-on, or inconsistent, clauses.”). -”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “By their own choice of language, appel-lees agreed to take reasonable precautions to assure [the child’s] safety. This duty to undertake reasonable care expressed in the first part of the provision would be rendered meaningless if the exculpatory clause absolved appellees from liability. We cannot ignore this language because all terms of a contract provision must be read as a whole to give every statement meaning. Construing the exculpatory clause as a whole, appellees’ release from liability rests on their exercise of reasonable care to ensure [the child’s] safety and good health.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.