Brown v. Powell’s Empirical Analysis
975 F.2d 1 · 1992
Citation profile
27 federal appellate · 12 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 48 later decisions — most recently July 2021 · most notably United States v. Luciano-Mosquera (1995), United States v. Alvarez (1993)
27 federal appellate · 12 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Delaware v. Van Arsdall · Davis v. Alaska · Gault · Delaware v. Fensterer · Kentucky v. Stincer
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[w]hether a trial court has abused its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a witness for bias depends on whether the jury had sufficient other information before it, without the excluded evidence, to make a discriminating appraisal of the possible biases and motivations of the witnesses.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[i]t does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The issue here is whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed constitutional error when it prevented the jury from hearing the potential penalty Warner [the witness/co-conspirator] avoided by pleading out of a first-degree murder charge.... The jury at petitioner’s trial was clearly given sufficient information from which it could conclude that ... the accomplice ... had a substantial motivation to testify against petitioner and lie.... [T]he jury could have inferred that by pleading guilty to manslaughter and receiving a sentence of 15 to 30 years, Warner had avoided a significantly harsher penalty than if he had been tried and convicted.... The jury had more than sufficient information to conclude that Warner had a strong incentive to he in order to receive a lesser sentence.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.