975 F. Supp. 565 - Fluellen v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Pursuant to the 1996 AEDPA amendments, however, the Court may exercise discretion to hear and deny petitioner’s non-exhausted claim; the total exhaustion rule is no longer binding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (c) [sic; § 2254(b) ]. The Court, however, declines to exercise the discretion to hear and dismiss petitioner’s application in this case. By refusing to exercise the discretion provided under section 2254(c) [sic; § 2254(b) ], this Court endorses the rationale of the “total exhaustion rule” and continues to furnish state appellate courts the initial opportunity to correct trial court decisions. Moreover, the refusal to exercise discretion here does not conflict with the intent of Congress. In fact, enforcing the “total exhaustion rule” in this context will “encourage habeas petitioners to exhaust all of their claims in state court and to present the federal court with a single habeas petition.” Rose, 455 U.S. at 520 , 102 S.Ct. at 1204 . This will serve to avoid piecemeal litigation and eventually decrease the burden on federal courts. Id. Finally, the Court notes that applying the “total exhaustion rule” in cases such as this one does not unduly prejudice petitioners. Those who misunderstand the requirement and submit unacceptable “mixed petitions” may resubmit their application pending either the removal of the unex-hausted claim, or exhaustion of the offending claim at the state level.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 51 F. Supp. 2d 415 - Otero v. Stinson · 14 F. Supp. 2d 503 - Cowans v. Artuz

2. “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 14 F. Supp. 2d 503 - Cowans v. Artuz