975 So. 2d 488 - Rios v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] 'citizen encounter becomes an investigatory . . . stop[ ] once an officer shows authority in a manner that restrains the defendant's freedom of movement such that a reasonable person would feel compelled to comply.'”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Moore v. State · JC v. State

2. “Blocking a person's path or otherwise restraining movement is one indication that [an investigatory] stop has occurred. See, e.g., Alvarez v. State , 515 So.2d 286 , 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (partially blocking suspect's sole exit from train compartment was one factor indicating that a detention had occurred); United States v. Bowles , 625 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) ( Fourth Amendment seizure occurred when officer ran past suspect, held out credentials, and turned to face him, thus blocking his path); cf. State v. Livingston , 681 So.2d 762 , 763-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (that officers did not block suspect's path was one factor in court's conclusion that the contact was a consensual encounter); State v. Mitchell , 638 So.2d 1015 , 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (`An officer may address questions to anyone on the street, and unless the officer attempts to prevent the citizen from exercising his right to walk away, such questioning will usually constitute a consensual encounter rather than a stop.').”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lewis, Wm-08-009 (11-7-2008)

3. “[Tjhere was no testimony as to present criminal activity in which [defendant] might have been engaged or potential future criminal activity; indeed, criminal activity during these timeframes was not an issue at all." Moreover, the only potential source of reasonable suspicion as to past criminal acts in which [defendant] might have engaged was the activity for which his half-brother [ ] was to be arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant. However, “[t]he existence of an arrest warrant is of no moment on the question whether a particular person police officers come across is in fact the subject of the warrant. The warrant supplies the officers with probable cause to arrest the person it names and describes, not a license to duck the reasonable suspicion requirement and stop someone they only have a subjective hunch is that person.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 150 So. 3d 1273 - Richard Scott v. State