¶2I concur in the main opinion, but I note that it remands the cause for the entry of a judgment in favor of Harvey Martin and David Whitten even though they did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by means other than a new-trial motion. In King Mines Resort, Inc. v. Malachi Mining Minerals, Inc., 518 So.2d 714 (Ala. 1987), our Supreme Court held that if insufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment based upon a jury verdict is raised in a new-trial motion instead of in a motion under Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P., "the only relief that can be granted is a new trial" in the event of a reversal. 518 So.2d at 716. However, because the judgment in *996 this case was entered by the trial court after anonjury trial, a new-trial motion will suffice to preserve an evidentiary-sufficiency question for appellate review (regardless of whether findings of fact are made).See New Props., L.L.C. v. Stewart, 905 So.2d 797,801-02 (Ala. 2004). Because there is no requirement in a nonjury setting that corresponds to the requirement prevailing in a jury setting that a party file a dispositive motion as an absolute prerequisite to a sufficiency challenge, KingMines does not require a new trial on remand in this case.
¶4I respectfully dissent insofar as the main opinion reverses the judgment in favor of Robert Patterson on his invasion-of-privacy claim. On the basis of the ore tenus evidence before it, the trial court could have found that Harvey Martin and David Whitten had repeatedly shadowed Patterson for the purpose of intimidating and harassing him and that Whitten had threatened Patterson's life. That conduct is actionable under the wrongful-intrusion prong of the tort of invasion of privacy. Cf. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v.Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 445, 225 So.2d 848, 850 (1969) (noting with approval that other jurisdictions had held that "violation of the right of privacy may be actionable where the investigation of a person being watched, shadowed, or kept under surveillance is pursued in an offensive or improper manner"). The suggestion that a reasonable person would not find Martin's and Whitten's conduct highly offensive is absurd" indeed, the Alabama Legislature has classified such conduct as the crime of stalking, which is a felony. See § 13A-6-90(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("A person who intentionally and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat, either expressed or implied, with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm is guilty of the crime of stalking.").
¶5I concur in the result with regard to the other aspects of the main opinion.