¶1dissenting.
¶2I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we have jurisdiction over this appeal and thus concur in its judgment to that extent. But I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment reversing the trial court’s order and remanding this case for further proceedings. The non-resident plaintiffs have not established an “essential need” for trying their claims in Bexar County.
¶3The non-resident plaintiffs concede they cannot independently establish venue in Bex-ar County and must therefore show an “essential need” for their claims to be tried here. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.003(a)(3) (Vernon Supp.1998). They also recognize that because the legislature did not define “essential need,” we must give the phrase its common meaning. As we stated in Masonite, we must construe the term employing the usual rules of statutory construction, striving to give effect to the underlying legislative intent and “following] the rules of grammar and common usage.” Masonite Corp. v. Garcia, 951 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1997, writ requested).
¶4To meet their burden of establishing “essential need,” the non-resident plaintiffs, citing In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir.1990), argue that “the Fifth Circuit ... in Fibreboard accurately states the essential need to conserve judicial resources and to prevent the multiplicity of suits in various cases in trying common issues.” I agree the conservation of judicial resources and the prevention of a multiplicity of suits involving common issues of law and fact are serious concerns and valid goals of a judicial system. But, as we recognized in Masonite, the expenditure of judicial resources on a multiplicity of suits involving common issues of law and fact was a “type of result ... contemplated by the legislature” since “[o]p-ponents and committee witnesses pointed out that while the legislation would curb Polaris-style forum shopping, it could also lead to inefficient and impractical splintering of lawsuits, by requiring the claims of similarly situated plaintiffs against the same defendants to be tried in different counties.” Ma*43sonite, 951 S.W.2d at 818 (referring to Polaris Inv. Management Corp. v. Abascal, 890 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ)). Indeed, in Masonite, section 15.003 “caused the claims of similarly situated plaintiffs against the same defendants to be splintered into sixteen lawsuits in sixteen different counties.” Id.Here, by contrast, there will be only three.
¶5As noted above, without positive guidance from the legislature, we must interpret “essential need” according to its common usage. Id.at 816 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988)). One definition of “essential” — the definition the parties have offered in their briefs, in fact — is “indispensably necessary; important in the highest degree; requisite.” Surgitek, Inc. v. Adams, 955 S.W.2d 884, 890 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1997, pet. requested) (quoting Blaok’s Law Dictionaby 546 (6th ed.1990)); see also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 425 (1988). But there is no evidence to establish, and the non-resident plaintiffs do not even argue, it is “indispensably necessary” that they be permitted to maintain their claims in Bexar County. They simply argue that it would be more efficient.
¶6Given these circumstances, to classify either judicial efficiency, argued by the nonresident plaintiffs, or “the need to pool resources,” adopted by the majority, as “essential need” thwarts the legislative intent underlying section 15.003 and the common usage of the legislature’s chosen term. We must, therefore, affirm the trial court’s order. Because the majority fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.