State v. Jackson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921 , cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905 , 124 S.Ct. 1604 , 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); State v. Murray, 36,137 (La.App.2d Cir.8/29/02), 827 So.2d 488 , writ denied, 2002-2634 (La.9/5/03), 852 So.2d 1020 . This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517 . The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 1994-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442 . A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Gilliam, 36,188 (La.App.2d Cir.8/30/02), 827 So.2d 508 , writ denied, 2002-3090 (La.11/14/03), 858 So.2d 422 . When there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La.App.2d Cir.9/”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 34 So. 3d 494 - State v. Julien

2. “After the jury found that he had specific intent to kill Lajoy Livingston, the defendant argues that the jury could not have found the requisite general intent to convict him of illegal use of a weapon while committing aggravated criminal damage to property. To find the defendant guilty on this count, the jury was required to find that the defendant intentionally discharged his firearm under circumstances indicating that he, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have known that it was reasonably certain that one of the bullets would strike the bus, and that it was foreseeable that his action would endanger the lives of the children aboard. Because the crime of aggravated criminal damage to property is a general intent crime, the jury was not required to find that the defendant actively desired to hit the bus, only that hitting the bus was a reasonably certain outcome of his intentional discharge of the handgun.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 34 So. 3d 494 - State v. Julien

3. “Aggravated criminal damage to property is the intentional damaging of any structure, watercraft, or movable, wherein it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered, by any means other than fire or explosion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Apodaca