Barrow v. Falck’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Some lawyers dedicate their professional lives to causes they find admirable and worthy of support — to legal services for the poor, to the representation of unions. These lawyers are making contributions to their favored causes, not in money but in time. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 , 104 S.Ct. 1541 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), holds that lawyers who donate their services at bargain rates to legal aid organizations may collect under § 1988 the fees they could obtain if the charitable element were removed. Likewise, Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C.Cir.1988) (in banc), holds that lawyers who reduce their hourly rates when providing services to environmental plaintiffs may collect the market rate for the time — the rate that the solvent defendants would have paid for work of like quality. These cases, like our own opinion in Continental Illinois Securities, hold that the market rate of legal time is the opportunity cost of that time, the income foregone [sic — should be “forgone”] by representing this plaintiff. Using opportunity cost as the measure of legal services means that the value of the lawyer’s gift inures to the favored cause, and not to the adversary in litigation.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Farley, Inc. · 871 F. Supp. 2d 781 - National Rifle Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Village of Oak Park

2. “Section 1988 permits a court to shift to defendant only those legal fees incurred in “proceedings to enforce” a few listed federal statutes. When proceedings in state courts or agencies are part of the “enforcement” of § 1988, then time reasonably devoted to them is compensable. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 , 100 S.Ct. 2024 , 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980). But rights under labor contracts and local civil service laws do not arise under the Constitution or federal statutes, and efforts to secure their benefits in state forums are not “proceedings to enforce” § 1983. North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 , 107 S.Ct. 336 , 93 L.Ed.2d 188 (1986); Webb v. Dyer County Board of Education, 471 U.S. 234 , 105 S.Ct. 1923 , 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985). Barrow’s claim is all but a rerun of Webb , which held that time spent before a state administrative body to secure tenure rights established by state law may not be charged against the defendant under § 1988, even though the defendants’ acts violated the Constitution along with state law. The district court must reevaluate the claim for fees, excluding time devoted to seeking remedies before the state commission and court.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 927 F. Supp. 579 - Vecchia v. Town of North Hempstead · Simi Investment Company Inc v. Harris County Texas -

3. “A premium rate for civil rights cases, applicable only when the other side is paying, looks like nothing so much as a disguised multiplier. Judges must stick to the market rate for the attorneys’ time — that is to say, the opportunity costs of their time, the rate they could receive in other engagements. Unless there is evidence that attorneys receive more per hour, from their own clients, in civil rights litigation than in other kinds of litigation — and this record contains no such evidence — the court must use the hourly rate for the attorney’s regular legal services.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 857 F. Supp. 1292 - Johnson v. Lafayette Fire Fighters' Ass'n Local 472 · Gusman v. Unisys Corp.