Moss v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The standard used in reviewing closing arguments is “whether the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney’s improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice.” Rushing v. State, 711 So.2d 450, 455 (¶ 15) (Miss.1998) (quoting Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1270 (Miss.1996)). In reviewing whether a prosecutor’s closing remarks constitute reversible error, we are to employ a two-part test. Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 318 (¶ 55) (Miss.2006). First, we review the remarks and determine whether the remarks were improper. Id. If we find that the prosecutor’s statements during summation were improper, then we analyze whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s rights. Id. “It must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt, that absent the prosecutor’s comments, the jury could have found the defendant guilty.” Id. Moss v. State, 977 So.2d 1201, 1211 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). “Attorneys are allowed wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury, but they are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury.” Shumpert v. State, 935 So.2d 962, 972 (¶ 38) (Miss.2006).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kleckner v. State

2. “Our supreme court has interpreted Rule 105 to provide that a trial court is not obligated to sua sponte give a limiting instruction regarding the admittance of a prior conviction under Rule 404(b), overruling a line of cases requiring such an instruction. Brown v. State, 890 So.2d 901, 913 (¶ 36) (Miss.2004). The court held that Mississippi Rule of Evidence 105 “clearly places the burden of requesting a Rule 404(b) limiting instruction upon counsel.” Id. As the admittance of evidence of a prior conviction under Rule 404(b) has been analogized to the admittance of such evidence for the purpose of impeachment under Rule 609, Bounds v. State, 688 So.2d 1362, 1369 (Miss.1997), we can find no reason why the same rule should not apply in this instance. Thus, we hold that because the burden to request a limiting instruction falls upon defense counsel in the admittance of 404(b) evidence, the burden falls upon defense counsel to request a limiting instruction in the context of the admittance of prior convictions through impeachment under Rule 609.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 75 So. 3d 63 - Johnson v. State

3. “It is well established that if a defendant opens the door to the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence, the State then may proceed to question further into the matter.... But, “[t]he impeachment evidence is admissible only for the purpose of impeaching credibility and may not be used for the purpose of establishing its truth.” Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 848 ([¶]31) (Miss.2005) ( [citation omitted]). “The State is further limited in that its ‘impeachment privilege may not exceed the invitation extended.’ ” [7d] (quoting Stewart, 596 So.2d at 853). However, “if a defendant opens the door to [a] line of testimony, ordinarily he may not complain about the prosecutor’s decision to accept the benevolent invitation to cross the threshold.” Kolberg v. State, 829 So.2d 29, 56 ( [¶]56) (Miss.2002) ([citation omitted]).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 16 So. 3d 751 - Butler v. State