¶1dissenting to denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw mandate, supplement the record, grant rehearing, and reconsider points.
¶2Appellant seeks withdrawal of our mandate, supplementation of the record with a *606newly discovered transcription of an in camera hearing, and reconsideration of points relating to the trial court’s compelled production of maps and evidence obtained based upon said production.
¶3Granting rehearing on a case after mandate has issued, with or without a motion from a party, is certainly not unheard of. For instance, in Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39 (Tex.Cr.App.1997) (op. on reh’g), this Court recalled the mandate over four months after mandate had issued and granted an untimely State’s motion for rehearing. More recently in Ex parte Patterson, 969 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.Cr.App.1998)(op. on reh’g), we granted rehearing on our own motion on the very day the opinion on original submission was delivered. And even more recently in Mosley v. State, — S.W.2d -, 1998 WL 349513 (Tex.Cr.App. No. 72,281, delivered July 1, 1998)(op. on reh’g), we granted rehearing on our own motion and withdrew our original opinion, and refused to entertain any motion for rehearing of that original opinion from the parties. Thus it is not unheard of for this Court to grant rehearing on its own motion.
¶4And appellant’s motion suggesting that we grant such rehearing informs us that a transcription of a newly discovered in camera hearing, which contains information relevant to the disposition of points of error one and two, has recently been recovered. This transcription shows that the trial judge, in determining whether to order production of the maps in question, believed that the decedent in this case was already dead and thus there was no continuing kidnapping. Specifically, in camera, the trial judge said,
I’m convinced that the child is deceased. And since I’m convinced the child is deceased, I don’t really see how it can be an ongoing crime.
¶5The trial judge added that he didn’t see how he was going to order appellant’s attorney to reveal the maps. He even commented that appellant’s attorney was “doing the right thing” and that “[t]he rest of us must do the right thing. You’ve shamed us into it.” Nevertheless, when the trial judge reappeared in open court with the world watching and all shame was apparently brushed aside, the trial judge ordered appellant’s attorney to produce the maps, which aided law enforcement officials in locating the decedent.
¶6This newly discovered transcription of the in camera proceeding certainly contains evidence that could impact this Court’s analysis, since this Court initially concluded that “[a]t the time the trial court compelled production of the maps, authorities had reason to believe that the baby might still be alive.” Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d at 557. However, as quoted above, the trial judge, who was the fact finder on the map production/suppression claims, point blankly did not believe the decedent was still alive. And such a conclusion simply makes sense — how can a three-and-a-half-month-old infant who has been abandoned and left alone outside for several days still be alive?
¶7Of course this evidence of the in camera hearing may not alter the conclusion of this Court, i.e. even after considering it this Court may very well still conclude that points one and two must be overruled. However, we should withdraw the mandate and grant rehearing to at least address this new evidence and dispose of the points based upon a complete record. Because this Court refuses to do so, I dissent.