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← 978 F.2d 171 - United States v. Smith

United States v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

978 F.3d 171 · 1992

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
7
states following
May 2025
most recently cited

21 federal appellate · 2 district · 9 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently May 2025 · most notably United States v. Kelley (1993), Darlie Kee (2001)

21 federal appellate · 2 district · 9 state decisions

2701992200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 924

Relies on Glasser v. United States · Katz v. United States · Rakas v. Illinois · United States v. Jacobsen · Welsh v. Wisconsin

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Courts should bear in mind that the issue is not whether it is conceivable that someone could eavesdrop on a conversation but whether it is reasonable to expect privacy. No matter how technologically advanced cordless communication becomes, some people will always find a way to eavesdrop on their neighbors. However, “[t]he fact that [Listening] Toms abound does not license the government to follow suit.” Although we express no opinion as to what features or circumstances would be necessary to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, it should be obvious that as technological advances make cordless communications more private at some point such communication will be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Given this conclusion, it should be equally obvious that it is not enough for a trial court to conclude that interception of a conversation does not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns simply because it is carried by a “cordless” phone. Application of the Fourth Amendment in a given case will depend largely upon the specific technology used ....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “[b]ecause communications made on some cordless telephones can be intercepted easily with readily available technologies, such as an AM radio, it would be inappropriate to make the interception of such a communication a criminal offense”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.