Reyes v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It practically goes without saying — although the United States Supreme Court expressly said it in United States v. DiFrancesco [, 449 U.S. 117, 137 , 101 S.Ct. 426, 437 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) ] — that the double jeopardy clause is not violated when a sentencing court revokes a defendant’s probation and imposes a previously suspended prison term. In such circumstances, the defendant’s sentence has not been “increased” because, from the beginning, it was understood that the defendant’s imprisonment would remain suspended only if the defendant abided by the conditions of probation. [[Image here]] Since the DiFrancesco decision, most courts have held (either explicitly or implicitly) that when a defendant challenges a modification of their sentence on double jeopardy grounds, the double jeopardy issue must be resolved by examining the applicable sentencing statutes and deciding whether, from the beginning, the court was authorized to modify the sentence in that way.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Surrells v. State

2. “[In United States u] DiFrancesco [, the United States Supreme Court] held that, for purposes of the federal double jeopardy clause, a criminal sentence does not have the same “finality” as a verdict of acquittal. Thus, ... legislatures may grant courts significant power to re-examine criminal sentences — and modify them to the defendant’s detriment — without defeating the defendant’s “legitimate expectations” of finality. Since the DiFrancesco decision, most courts have held (either explicitly or implicitly) that when a defendant challenges a modification of their sentence on double jeopardy grounds, the double jeopardy issue must be resolved by examining the applicable sentencing statutes and deciding whether, from the beginning, the court was authorized to modify the sentence in that way.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Marunich v. State

3. “as a verdict of acquittal. [See id., 449 U.S. at 137 , 101 S.Ct. at 438 .] Thus, while verdicts of acquittal are virtually immune from judicial re-examination, legislatures may grant courts significant power to reexamine criminal sentences-and modify them to the defendant's detriment-without defeating the defendant's”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hill v. State