978 So. 2d 1062 - State v. Wright’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
12
cited by 12 later decisions
1
states following
May 2019
most recently cited
12 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · State v. Dorthey · Hudson v. Louisiana · 384 So. 2d 355 - State v. Bonanno · 603 So. 2d 731 - State v. Hearold
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In the alternative, Defendant argues that the conviction should be reduced to manslaughter because he killed Ferguson in “sudden blood heat of passion” when Ferguson was fighting for the gun. In pertinent part, La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1) defines manslaughter as a “homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.” State v. Ellis, 42,286 (La. App.2d Cir.7/11/07), 961 So.2d 636 , lorit denied, 07-1641 (La.1/25/08), 973 So.2d 753 . “Sudden passion” and “heat of blood” are mitigating factors in the nature of a defense; and, when such factors are established by a preponderance of the evidence, a verdict for murder is inappropriate. State v. Baker, 41,555 (La.App.2d Cir.8/15/07), 962 So.2d 1198 , citing State v. Leger, 05-0011 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108 , cert. denied, [549] U.S. [1221], 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007). The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in “sudden passion” or “heat of blood.” State v. Robinson, 32,794 (La.App.2d Cir.3/1/00), 754 So.2d 311 , writ denied, 00-0989 (La.3/23/01), 787 So.2d 1008 . The defendant is not obligated to establish the factors affirmatively; the jury may infer them from the evidence presented. State v. Ellis, supra, citing State v. Jackson, 34,076”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“"Sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are mitigating factors in the nature of a defense; and, when such factors are established by a preponderance of the evidence, a verdict for murder is inappropriate. State v. Baker , 41,555 (La.App. 2d Cir. 8/15/07), 962 So.2d 1198 , citing State v. Leger , 05-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108 , cert. denied , [549] U.S. [1221], 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007). The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in "sudden passion" or "heat of blood." State v. Robinson , 32,794 (La.App. 2d Cir. 3/1/00), 754 So.2d 311 , writ denied , 00-0989 (La. 3/23/01), 787 So.2d 1008 . The defendant is not obligated to establish the factors affirmatively; the jury may infer them from the evidence presented. State v. Ellis , supra , [42,286 (La.App. 2d Cir. 7/11/07), 961 So.2d 636 ] citing State v. Jackson , 34,076 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So.2d 1046 . Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the defendant's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed. State v. Ellis, supra ."If a man unreasonably permits his impulse and passion to obscure his judgment, he will be fully responsible for the consequences of his act." State v. Leger, supra . Questions of provocation and time for cooling are questions for the jury to determine under the standard of the average or ordinary person with ordinary self-c”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Heard“A homicide is justifiable: (1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger. (2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be com mitted and that such action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing. 3”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.